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INTRODUCTION 
In the American struggle for social justice, public interest litigation has 
played an indisputably important role.  Yet over the past three decades, 
critics from both the left and right have challenged its capacity to secure 
systemic change.  The critiques have varied, but have centered on two basic 
claims.  The first is that litigation cannot itself reform social institutions.  
The second related concern is that over-reliance on courts diverts effort 
from potentially more productive political strategies and disempowers the 
groups that lawyers are seeking to assist.  The result is too much law and 
too little justice. 
These critiques, although powerful in their analysis of the limits of liti-
gation, have generally failed to adequately acknowledge its contributions 
and the complex ways in which legal proceedings can support political mo-
bilization.1  Against the examples of lawyer domination, there are compet-
ing accounts of client empowerment and community-directed lawsuits.2  
Even as liberal critics have disparaged reliance on courts, conservative ac-
tivists have enlisted them in efforts to block or roll back progressive 
change.3 
This Article seeks to situate the debate over public interest litigation in a 
richer theoretical and empirical context.  In essence, our argument is that 
such litigation is an imperfect but indispensable strategy of social change.  
Our challenge is to increase its effectiveness through better understanding 
of its capacities and constraints. 
 
 1. See RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
APARTHEID, 1980–1994 (1995); Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s 
“Allurements”: A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in 
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261 
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). 
 2. See MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS 
OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movements Chal-
lenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1927 (2007) 
[hereinafter Cummings, Wal-Mart]. 
 3. See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSER-
VATIVE COALITION (2008); STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVE-
MENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest 
Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2037 (2008) [hereinafter Rhode, 
Public Interest Law]. 
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To that end, we draw on two bodies of work: research on law and social 
change, and research on social philanthropy.  The first literature offers a 
detailed empirical and theoretical picture of how lawyers mobilize law to 
change institutional rules and redistribute power.4  In its empirical dimen-
sion, this research explores the ideals and practices of public interest law-
yers and how their strategies are informed by where they work—non-profit 
public interest organizations, large firm pro bono programs, plaintiff-side 
law firms, and law school clinics.5  In its theoretical dimension, this litera-
ture draws on the sociology of law and social movements to explore the in-
terplay between legal proceedings and political mobilization.  A second 
body of work, which focuses on strategic philanthropy, holds important in-
sights for how public interest organizations and pro bono programs can 
most effectively direct their social reform efforts. 
We draw a number of lessons from this research.  The first is that litiga-
tion, although a necessary strategy of social change, is never sufficient; it 
cannot effectively work in isolation from other mobilization efforts.  Sec-
ond, money matters: how public interest law is financed affects the kinds of 
cases that can be pursued and their likely social impact.  A deeper under-
standing of financial constraints and opportunities in different practice con-
texts is therefore critical to effective reform.  A third key insight is the im-
portance of systematic evaluation.  Only through more reflective 
assessments of the impact of litigation can we realize its full potential in 
pursuit of social justice. 
Any discussion of these issues confronts a threshold definitional issue: 
what constitutes public interest litigation.  The concept of the “public inter-
est” is contested at the level of both theory and practice.6  Commentators 
differ over whether there are widely shared criteria for assessing the pub-
lic’s interest as well as whether any particular case meets the definition.7  
 
 4. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, 
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 3 (2004); see also CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITI-
CAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 1. 
 5. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of Public Inter-
est Practice: 1975–2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591 (2006); Rhode, Public Interest Law, supra 
note 3; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE (2005); 
SOUTHWORTH, supra note 3; Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. 
REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono]; Scott L. Cummings & 
Ann Southworth, Between Profit and Principle: The Private Public Interest Firm, in PRI-
VATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Cum-
mings & Southworth, Between Profit and Principle]. 
 6. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 4, at 5-7. 
 7. Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of Public 
Interest Law, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223 (2005). 
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Our point here is not to revisit that debate, but rather to suggest that it 
needs to become part of the process for evaluating social impact litigation.  
Lawyers who pursue what they consider “public interest” work need con-
crete criteria for assessing its impact and justifying their priorities.  In many 
contexts, there may be no single “right” answer about what advances social 
justice but there are better and worse ways of analyzing the question. 
I.  LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
A. Litigation and Its Discontents 
The role of law as an instrument of social change rests on a fundamental 
assumption about its relative autonomy from politics: decision makers are 
to some extent bound by legal rules irrespective of their political conse-
quences.8  Although the degree of judicial autonomy varies across contexts, 
it provides the leverage that public interest lawyers seek to exploit.  Litiga-
tion is a key strategy for protecting the rights and enlarging the power of 
subordinated groups, particularly when other channels of influence are un-
available.  Groups hobbled by discrimination or collective action problems 
may turn to courts as allies in the struggle for social justice. 
The public interest law movement that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s 
advanced this vision of court-centered social change,9 drawing on models 
from civil rights and civil liberties groups, particularly the test-case strategy 
of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.10  Early litigation vic-
tories brought status and resources to developing public interest organiza-
tions, which enlisted courts in progressive social reform.11  A number of 
structural factors encouraged this strategy: a federal judiciary receptive to 
civil rights claims; centralized administrative agencies susceptible to re-
 
 8. ABEL, supra note 1, at 1. 
 9. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996) (referring to 
the use of courts promote liberal social change to as “legal liberalism”). 
 10. For an overview, see DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 879-80 
(2005); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDU-
CATION, 1925–1950 (1987).  See generally PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTI-
TUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978); Louise G. Trubek, Crossing 
Boundaries: Legal Education and the Challenge of the “New Public Interest Law”, 2005 
WIS. L. REV. 455 (2005). 
 11. See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF 
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1 (1978) [hereinafter HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS]; 
Trubek, supra note 10, at 457-60; Burton A. Weisbrod, Conceptual Perspective on the Public 
Interest: An Economic Analysis, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 10, at 22. 
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form through impact lawsuits; and a system of welfare entitlements open to 
enforcement and expansion.12 
It was, in part, the very success of public interest litigation that threatened 
its structural foundations.  Courthouse victories fueled a conservative reac-
tion seeking to limit federal authority over civil rights and civil liberties, eco-
nomic and environmental regulation, and social welfare.  As the right gained 
power in the 1980s and 1990s, national governance structures were reshaped.  
An increasingly conservative federal judiciary became less hospitable to the 
claims of liberal public interest groups.  Federal agencies, long criticized as 
inefficient and unaccountable, lost authority in the trend toward decentraliza-
tion and deregulation.13  Core federal entitlements, particularly those involv-
ing welfare, were curtailed.14  These structural changes foreclosed litigation 
opportunities for liberal public interest organizations at the federal level, 
while opening the door to claims by the growing number of conservative ad-
vocacy groups.15  In addition, public interest lawyers faced new procedural 
and financial constraints: Congress prevented federally-funded legal services 
lawyers from bringing class actions, lobbying, collecting attorney’s fees, and 
engaging in political advocacy; the Supreme Court limited attorney’s fee 
awards in civil rights and environmental cases; and some states capped at-
torney’s fees and damage awards, and restricted the ability of law school 
clinics to undertake controversial cases.16 
This backlash coincided with a scholarly critique of public interest law, 
which came largely from the left.  One strand of criticism questioned the 
efficacy of litigation strategies.  It drew on empirical research to demon-
strate the inadequacy of law reform as a vehicle of social change.  Joel 
Handler’s assessment of public interest law concluded that litigation alone 
could not reform field-level practice in the consumer, environmental, civil 
rights, and welfare rights arenas due to the exercise of vast administrative 
discretion—what he called the “bureaucratic contingency.”17  Gerald Ro-
senberg’s quantitative study concluded that courts could “almost never be 
 
 12. Michael McCann & Jeffrey Dudas, Retrenchment…and Resurgence? Mapping the 
Changing Context of Movement Lawyering in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 37 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006); Trubek, supra note 
10. 
 13. JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION 
AND EMPOWERMENT (1996) [hereinafter HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY]; Jody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000). 
 14. JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY, 
AND WELFARE (1997). 
 15. Southworth, supra note 7. 
 16. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public Interest 
Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209 (2003). 
 17. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 11, at 18-22. 
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effective producers of significant social reform” because of their depend-
ence on other political institutions and their lack of enforcement powers.18 
A second critique emphasized the tradeoffs between litigation and politi-
cal mobilization.  Stuart Scheingold famously warned against the “myth of 
rights,” which diverted attention from the political roots of social prob-
lems.19  On this view, litigation drained scarce movement resources, cre-
ated confusion between “symbolic” and “substantive” victories, and co-
opted potential movement leaders by paying them off with monetary 
awards.  Critical legal scholars further argued that reframing collective 
grievances in terms of individual rights dissipated collective political en-
ergy.  Even when litigants prevailed, the result was to legitimize a funda-
mentally unjust social and legal order.20  For these critics, collective politi-
cal struggle was the only effective way to challenge structural inequality.21 
A third line of criticism revolved around issues of accountability.  In one 
of the most influential expressions of this concern, Derrick Bell challenged 
the NAACP’s school desegregation campaign.  In his view, the NAACP’s 
commitment to desegregation—supported by its middle-class white and 
black constituents—ignored the preferences of black communities for local 
control and quality initiatives in neighborhood schools.22  Poverty law 
scholars in the 1990s, incorporating insights from critical race theory and 
feminist scholarship, extended this analysis by focusing on the marginaliza-
tion of clients in traditional litigation strategies.23 
B. Beyond Critique: The Pragmatic Turn in Law and Social Change 
Scholarship 
The critique of rights associated with first-wave public interest law part-
ly reflected disillusionment with its failure to achieve transformational 
 
 18. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 338 (1991). 
 19. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE 3-10 (1974); see also GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE 
CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Ex-
tralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 937 (2007) (cataloging the criticisms of rights strategies). 
 20. Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal 
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1983). 
 21. Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053 (1970). 
 22. Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
 23. LÓPEZ, supra note 19; Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: 
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Lucie E. White, Subordi-
nation, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
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change.  With time and scholarly distance have come new approaches to 
understanding the relationship between law and social reform.  These ap-
proaches reflect varied theoretical and empirical frameworks, but share a 
pragmatic focus.  They start from the premise that litigation has limits, but 
go on to question how it can best advance social justice.  In essence, this 
literature addresses the tradeoffs of different forms of activism—including 
litigation—in different social contexts and practice sites.  Its key claims are 
that: (1) litigation is a political tool that, when used strategically, can stimu-
late meaningful change and complement other political efforts; (2) whether 
litigation “works” or not must be judged in relation to available alterna-
tives; and (3) in order to evaluate the social change potential of litigation in 
a given circumstance, it is necessary to examine the conditions—political, 
economic, cultural, and organizational—within which a lawsuit operates. 
1. Law as Politics 
Recent scholarly efforts to reassess what lawyers can “do for, and to” 
social movements tend to offer more positive accounts of impact litiga-
tion.24  This research sees law as politics by another name, and links court-
room battles to political mobilization and community organizing.  In these 
accounts, litigation is shaped by clients and community activists and the 
objective is political transformation, not doctrinal victory.25 
This is not, of course, a new conceptualization.  Three decades ago, 
Handler underscored both the direct and indirect ways that legal claims 
shape social movements.26  During the same era, Gary Bellow advanced a 
“focused case” strategy in combination with community organizing and 
legislative advocacy.27  Throughout this period, labor lawyers similarly saw 
litigation as a means of advancing the cause of unionization.28  What con-
temporary research offers is a deeper theoretical and empirical foundation 
for integrating legal advocacy and political mobilization. 
At the theoretical level, William Simon has proposed a model of lawyer-
ing that promotes flexibility, transparency, evaluation, and inclusive par-
 
 24. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social 
Movements: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 12, 
at 1. 
 25. Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type…: Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 657, 683 (2004). 
 26. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 11, at 191-201. 
 27. Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 
NLADA BRIEFCASE 106, 121-22 (1977). 
 28. See Jennifer Gordon, A Movement in the Wake of a New Law: The United Farm 
Workers and the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SO-
CIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 12, at 279. 
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ticipation in institutional decision-making processes.29  While he raises 
questions about the winner-take-all approach of traditional impact strate-
gies, he believes that litigation, when combined with inclusive political 
processes, can be put to pragmatic ends.  For example, when deployed stra-
tegically, lawsuits can destabilize entrenched institutional structures and 
subject them to greater accountability.30  From a social science perspective, 
Michael McCann argues for a constitutive understanding of the role of law 
in social transformation.  That approach moves beyond a causal analysis of 
the relationship between court decisions and social outcomes, and instead 
traces the complex processes by which law shapes social meaning and in-
forms individual and collective action.31  For example, a lawsuit that re-
ceives widespread attention may raise public consciousness and stimulate 
movement activity by revealing the vulnerability of structural arrangements 
that once seemed impervious to change.32  Even lawsuits unsuccessful in 
the courts may generate public outrage that spurs political action.  From 
this perspective, judicial decisions are not simply legal decrees, but also so-
cial signals that are channeled into collective movements.33  Similarly, le-
gal action may allow activists to leverage gains by putting specific issues 
on the public agenda and threatening to impose litigation costs if decision 
makers fail to find political solutions.34  Assessing the animal rights 
movement, McCann finds that “[w]hen carefully coordinated with demon-
strations, pranks, and other media events, high-profile litigation worked as 
a double-barreled threat—at once mobilizing public opinion against tar-
geted ‘abusers’ and threatening both costly legal proceedings and possible 
defeats in court.”35  Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, who have led a 
path-breaking investigation into cause lawyering over the past decade, have 
similarly concluded that in the right circumstances, lawyers can make 
“seminal contributions to the building of social movements.”36 
 
 29. William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Chal-
lenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 181, 193, 198 (2004). 
 30. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Lit-
igation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2004). 
 31. McCann & Silverstein, supra note 1, at 269. 
 32. Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social Movements?, in HOW DOES 
LAW MATTER?  FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN LAW AND SOCIETY RESEARCH 76, 83-84 (Bryant G. 
Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998) [hereinafter McCann, How Does Law Matter?]. 
 33. Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT 
COURTS 117, 125-26 (Keith Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983). 
 34. McCann, How Does Law Matter?, supra note 32, at 92. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 24, at 10; see also CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES supra note 1; CAUSE LAWYERING AND 
THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); CAUSE LAW-
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Empirical research on public interest lawyers suggests that they often 
view their work as complementing and contributing to political mobiliza-
tion.  McCann and Helena Silverstein’s study of the pay-equity and animal 
rights movements found that lawyers generally did not view lawsuits as 
“ends in themselves” and were “committed to encouraging, enhancing, and 
supplementing” movement activity.37  Similarly, Ann Southworth’s study 
of civil rights and poverty lawyers found that both groups saw litigation as 
part of multi-dimensional strategies.38  Many perceived lawsuits as “politi-
cal assets” that could provoke legislative reform, discourage future wrong-
doing, and mobilize community participation.39  In the same vein, Cum-
mings’ project on low-wage worker advocacy in Los Angeles has 
examined lawyers who view legal advocacy as part of a comprehensive 
campaign that deploys multiple strategies to advance local policy reforms 
to strengthen labor rights.40 
Rhode’s recent empirical study of prominent public interest organiza-
tions confirms that their leaders generally recognize the need to think stra-
tegically and to pursue multiple approaches.41  Litigation remains impor-
tant, but it is used strategically in tandem with other initiatives.42  Some 
90% of leading public interest legal organizations bring impact cases, and 
nearly half devote at least 50% of their efforts to such work.43  These law-
suits often attempt to maximize effectiveness by targeting practices that re-
quire systemic reform.44  Objectives apart from winning can be critical, 
such as making a public record, raising awareness, or imposing sufficient 
costs and delays that will force defendants to adopt more socially responsi-
 
YERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 12; THE WORLDS THAT CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE 
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005); cf. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra 
note 11; SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 4. 
 37. McCann & Silverstein, supra note 1, at 269. 
 38. Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the “Myth of Rights” in Civil Rights and Poverty 
Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 477 (1999) [hereinafter Southworth, Lawyers and the 
“Myth of Rights”]. 
 39. Id. at 470. 
 40. Cummings, Wal-Mart, supra note 2, at 1985-88; see also Scott L. Cummings, 
Hemmed In: Legal Mobilization in the Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cummings, Hemmed In]. 
 41. Rhode, Public Interest Law, supra note 3, at 2046. 
 42. The typical effort devoted to litigation fell from 60% of total workload in 1975 to 
51% in 2007; during the same period, the typical amount of legislative work increased from 
7% to 17% and research, reports, education, and media activities grew from 12% to 265.  Id. 
at 2047-48.  However, because the figures from 2007 come from a different sample of or-
ganizations than the 1975 study, the change reflects broad trends not precise comparisons. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 2046; see also id. at 2046 n.101 (citing interviews with Carole Shauffer, Youth 
Law Center, Brian Stevenson, Equal Justice Initiative, and Tod Gaziano, Heritage Found.). 
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ble practices.45  Many leaders stress the need to maintain litigation as a 
“credible threat,” but also to avoid a “scattergun” approach that would 
“spread [resources] too thin” for structural change.46 
2. Relative Efficacy 
An important premise of the critique of litigation is that political mobili-
zation, such as organizing and social activism, is generally more effective 
in producing long-term change.  Reforms that come through the legislative 
process may appear more legitimate than those that come through courts.  
So too, political mobilization can create the ongoing citizen engagement 
that is crucial to sustain, consolidate, and build on victories.  For this rea-
son, scholars have raised concerns about what Orly Lobel calls “legal coop-
tation”—the tendency of legal strategies to dissipate activism and limit a 
movement’s transformative potential.47 
The more pragmatic approach to law and social change, however, sug-
gests that the limits of litigation cannot be assessed in a vacuum.  It is, of 
course, true that—under certain circumstances—litigation may divert activ-
ists from sustained mobilization or result in decisions that are susceptible to 
political reversal.  But so can political strategies.  A key insight of the re-
cent literature is that evaluations of litigation always need to consider the 
risks and feasibility of alternatives.  Sometimes political strategies are not 
realistic options because of the strength of the opposition.  Even when po-
litical strategies are possible, they are not always superior to litigation.  
Scholars often assume that political mobilization continues over time, but 
movements are frequently episodic. When successful, they often culminate 
in legislative actions that can sometimes trigger backlash. Thus, statutory 
reforms no less than judicial orders are vulnerable to strategic reinterpreta-
tion, deliberate non-enforcement, and political reversals.48  For instance, 
the crowning achievement of the labor movement in the 1930s—the Na-
 
 45. Id. at 2046-47; see also id. at 2047 n.102 (quoting Anthony Romero, ACLU, regard-
ing the value in making historical record, and Carl Pope, Sierra Club, regarding the value in 
taking cases to create delay and thus force a shift to more environmentally responsive ap-
proaches). 
 46. Id. at 2047-48; see also id. at 2048 n.103 (quoting references to “credible threats” 
from Brian Wolfman, Public Citizen; Richard Rothschild, Western Center on Law & Pov-
erty; Irma Herrera, Equal Rights Advocates; and Carole Shauffer, Youth Law Center; con-
cerns about “scattergun” approaches from Jamine Studley, Public Advocates; and references 
to “spreading too thin” from Barbara Olshansky, Center for Constitutional Rights). 
 47. Lobel, supra note 19, at 949. 
 48. See Edwin Amenta & Neal Caren, The Legislative, Organizational, and Beneficiary 
Consequences of State-Oriented Challengers, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 461 (David A. Snow et al., eds., 2004); Lobel, supra note 19, at 939; see also 
Gordon, supra note 28, at 277-78. 
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tional Labor Relations Act—has been consistently eroded through judicial 
decree, legislative amendment, and administrative interpretation.49  In 
short, the legitimacy of a law resulting from democratic processes does not 
insulate it from subsequent political challenge.  This is particularly true 
when the law benefits a less powerful group.50  Moreover, in some situa-
tions, legal strategies can prove highly effective in changing social practice, 
as when the rights at issue are relatively self-executing and do not require 
substantial administrative enforcement.  Judicial decrees mandating gay 
marriage are a case in point. 
What the recent literature suggests, therefore, is that the effectiveness of 
litigation in any given situation depends on a range of complex, contextual 
factors, and must be evaluated in relation to plausible alternatives.  Al-
though, as Scheingold warned, activists must avoid mythologizing rights, 
so too they must avoid romanticizing political activism. 
3. Opportunities and Constraints 
Focusing on the potential contributions of litigation—not just its lim-
its—invites analysis of the conditions that shape effective litigation strate-
gies.  Law and social movement scholars, in particular, have emphasized 
political and organizational structures that influence the development and 
impact of legal efforts.  Sarat and Scheingold have labeled this dynamic the 
“‘structure-agency’ problematic”—the interaction between structural “op-
portunities and constraints” and the actions of individual agents, like law-
yers, who can sometimes alter the structural terrain.51  The organizational 
level—where lawyers work—shapes norms, defines missions, and imposes 
resource constraints. 
Scholars associated with the political process school of social move-
ments emphasize the importance of the “political opportunity structure” in 
generating movement activities, defining the range of tactics, and identify-
ing goals.52  Formal political institutions constitute the key structural ele-
 
 49. See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 
(2002). 
 50. Indeed, Gordon’s recent work on the UFW suggests that legislative victories, such 
as the passage of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act in 1975, are “at least as 
vulnerable to subversion as their judge-made cousins, given their highly public and—in 
comparison with litigation victories—often potentially more far-reaching character.”  Gor-
don, supra note 28, at 289. 
 51. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, The Dynamics of Cause Lawyering: Constraints 
and Opportunities, in THE WORLDS THAT CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE, supra note 36, at 4-5. 
 52. Hanspeter Kriesi, Political Context and Opportunity, in THE BLACKWELL COMPAN-
ION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 48, at 67, 69.  On political process versus resource 
CUMMINGS_RHODE_CHRISTENSEN 6/23/2009  5:36:22 PM 
614 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
ment, and their degree of centralization shapes both the possibility for in-
tervention and the ability of the state to meet movement demands.53  These 
institutions have the power to reward or sanction movement activities: pol-
icy makers can increase the cost of challengers’ collective action through 
repression or assist it through political support.54  The legal regime shapes 
the political context both in the sense that it offers an institutional forum for 
attacking injustice and provides symbolic resources like “rights” for 
movement activists.55  A key incentive for movement actors, then, is the 
emergence of opportunities within the institutional structure that invite 
challenges.  For litigators, these opportunities include a receptive judiciary 
and statutory or doctrinal developments that allow for systemic change. 
Whether a movement can take advantage of such opportunities depends 
on its access to resources and its ability to marshal them in pursuit of col-
lective goals.56  Organizations therefore mediate the relationship between 
legal action and the broader political environment.57  Resources are neces-
sary not only to overcome the free-rider problem faced by groups seeking 
to provide collective goods, but also to sustain organizational activity in 
pursuit of movement goals.58  Resources often come with strings attached, 
which both enables and channels movement activities.59  For example, 
some public interest legal organizations report that foundations are reluc-
tant to fund litigation, and prefer new “hot” projects promising demonstra-
ble outcomes.60  Federally-funded legal services organizations are con-
strained by statutory restrictions.  Groups dependent on attorney’s fees 
must gear their activities toward revenue-generating cases. 
How resources are mobilized depends, in part, on an organization’s gov-
ernance structure and priorities, which reflect both formal rules and infor-
 
mobilization, see also Steven E. Barkan, Legal Control of the Southern Civil Rights Move-
ment, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 552 (1984). 
 53. Kriesi, supra note 52, at 70. 
 54. Id. at 78. 
 55. McCann, How Does Law Matter?, supra note 32, at 82. 
 56. See Bob Edwards & John D. McCarthy, Resources and Social Movement Mobiliza-
tion, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 48, at 116. 
 57. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY, supra note 13, at 20. 
 58. On resources and collective action, see MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION (1965); see also JOHN D. MCCARTHY & MAYER ZALD, THE TREND OF SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION (1973); J. 
Craig Jenkins, Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements, 9 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 527, 537-38 (1983).  On resources and group mobilization, see Bob Edwards & 
John D. McCarthy, Resources and Social Movement Mobilization, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 48, at 116; Jenkins, supra, at 533. 
 59. See Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 58, at 135. 
 60. Rhode, Public Interest Law, supra note 3, at 2056-57. 
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mal norms.  Groups that operate through staff consensus and loose over-
sight from a board of directors may have more freedom to allocate re-
sources than institutions subject to more hierarchical decision making, such 
as large law firms.  Organizations may place more or less value on collabo-
ration, political purity, community participation, and public recognition.  
How these contextual factors play out within public interest organiza-
tions—and interact with external opportunities—shapes the frequency and 
impact of public interest litigation. 
C. Lessons for Contemporary Public Interest Litigation 
The law and social change literature suggests several key lessons for 
public interest practice.  A central theme is that the effective use of litiga-
tion requires a strategic analysis of the forces that shape its outcome, in-
cluding organizational capacity, the likelihood of success on the merits, the 
challenges of enforcement, and the possible political responses.  This stra-
tegic analysis should be informed by two considerations.  The first relates 
to how lawyers can maximize the political impact of litigation.  Litigation 
typically works best when it is strategically embedded in broader political 
campaigns that help define litigation goals and enforce legal mandates.  
The second consideration involves which lawyers are most capable of 
bringing litigation in different circumstances.  The way that legal groups 
are structured affects the content and scope of their litigation dockets—
both in terms of the types of substantive cases they can file and the re-
sources they can marshal.  It is crucial, therefore, to understand the oppor-
tunities and constraints of distinct public interest workplace settings in or-
der to assess when litigation can best serve particular social justice causes. 
1. Litigation Integrated with Political Mobilization  
A key lesson from law and social change research is the importance of 
situating litigation within broader political campaigns—of using it as 
means to an end, rather than an end in itself.  Unlike early models of public 
interest litigation in which lawyers looked for test cases that could establish 
important principles, this approach explores multiple strategies from the 
outset, including not just lawsuits but also policy, organizing, and media 
initiatives.  Litigation is attractive only if it is the most effective means of 
advancing broader objectives.  Lawyers do not always take the lead in mak-
ing that determination, but frequently “appear as supporting players rather 
than main characters, seeking to help organizations build the power needed 
CUMMINGS_RHODE_CHRISTENSEN 6/23/2009  5:36:22 PM 
616 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
to achieve their goals.”61  This role does not eliminate concerns about ac-
countability, but rather changes their tenor.  For instance, commentators 
note the tensions between lawyers’ obligations to clients and the demands 
of organizing campaigns.62  And schisms within community groups can 
make it difficult to determine which stakeholders legitimately speak for the 
community.63  Nonetheless, proponents of politically integrated litigation 
believe that these tensions are a normal byproduct of movement activity 
and can usually be managed by setting clear expectations at the outset of 
campaigns.  Moreover, the costs of reconciling competing interests are 
generally offset by the political benefits of coordination. 
A growing number of examples across different substantive fields sug-
gest the potential of linking litigation to other forms of advocacy.  In the 
environmental context, some national legal groups stress the importance of 
addressing issues in a “campaign mode” that combines litigation and other 
advocacy strategies.64  Environmental justice lawyers have effectively used 
litigation, or the threat of litigation, in conjunction with grassroots organiz-
ing to prevent low-income communities of color from bearing the burden 
of environmental hazards.65 
The gay rights movement has also developed sophisticated linkages be-
tween legal and non-legal advocacy.66  In California, the struggle for same-
sex marriage has demonstrated the multiple ways that activists have tried to 
use litigation to both establish rights and to ignite support for political ef-
forts.  There, a 2000 statewide initiate defining marriage as between “a man 
and a woman” was challenged when San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom 
authorized city officials to issue marriage licenses to gay couples.  When 
anti-gay rights groups filed suit to stop the marriages, San Francisco re-
sponded by challenging the legality of the prohibition.  Gay couples and 
gay rights organizations like Equality California—represented by lawyers 
from the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the Lambda Legal Defense 
 
 61. Jennifer Gordon, Concluding Essay: The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist: Community 
Campaigns, Law, and Social Change, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2133, 2133 (2007). 
 62. See, e.g., Cummings, Hemmed In, supra note 40, at 19-20. 
 63. Cummings, Wal Mart, supra note 2, at 1991-97. 
 64. See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 891, 1016 (2008). 
 65. See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Orga-
nizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 474-75 (2001). 
 66. See QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW (Scott Barclay, et 
al. eds., 2009); Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher, Cause Lawyers in the First Wave of Same 
Sex Marriage Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 12, at 84; 
Scott Barclay & Anna Marie Marshall, Supporting a Cause, Developing a Movement, and 
Supporting a Practice: Cause Lawyers and Sexual Orientation Litigation in Vermont, in 
THE WORLDS THAT CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE, supra note 36, at 171. 
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and Education Fund, and the ACLU—filed additional lawsuits arguing that 
the ban on gay marriage violated the state constitution.  In May 2008, the 
California Supreme Court held that gay marriage was a constitutional right, 
reversing the 2000 initiative, but provoking opponents to launch another 
anti-gay marriage initiative: Proposition 8.  When Proposition 8 passed in 
November of 2008, amending the state constitution to prevent gay mar-
riage, it drew national attention and galvanized gay rights activists.  They 
again filed suit to overturn Proposition 8 on the ground that it constituted a 
revision to the state constitution, which required a two-thirds vote of the 
legislature.  The California Supreme Court rejected the challenge, but gay 
rights groups used the announcement of the court’s decision to stage large 
rallies and mobilize supporters, setting the stage for another effort to re-
verse Proposition 8 through political channels. 
The workers’ rights movement has also provided important examples of 
integrated political and legal campaigns.  Cummings’s study of anti-Wal 
Mart activism in Los Angeles is a case in point.67  In that campaign, a la-
bor-backed community group mounted a “site fight” to prevent the passage 
of a city initiative that would have approved the development of a Wal-
Mart Supercenter in Inglewood.  As part of the fight, the group’s lawyers 
filed a pre-election lawsuit to halt the initiative process, arguing that it vio-
lated the state constitution.  The labor activists understood at the outset that 
their chances of blocking the initiative before the scheduled city-wide vote 
were slim, given existing legal precedent.  However, they proceeded with 
the lawsuit in order to undermine the initiative’s legitimacy by highlighting 
the way that that it preempted the local land use and environmental laws 
that typically governed such developments.  Thus, the lawsuit was brought 
mainly for its public education and organizing impact.  And in fact, its fil-
ing generated substantial media attention that allowed the activists to get 
out their message that Wal-Mart saw itself as “above the law.”  This proved 
to be a powerful theme: although most community members had initially 
supported the Supercenter on economic grounds, the lawsuit helped to turn 
public opinion around and contributed to the initiative’s defeat. 
Sameer Ashar’s account of restaurant worker organizing in New York 
provides a similar example.68  There, workers were organized by the union-
backed Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-NY), which 
sought to target abuses at high-end chain restaurants in order to set new in-
dustry standards.  In one prominent campaign, ROC-NY collaborated with 
the CUNY Law School clinical program to represent “back-of-the-house” 
 
 67. See Cummings, Wal-Mart, supra note 2. 
 68. See Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. 
L. REV. 1879 (2007). 
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workers who had been denied minimum wage and overtime payments.  The 
litigation was specifically designed to advance broader industry-wide re-
form objectives and proceeded in tandem with public boycotts of the res-
taurants and a sophisticated media campaign.  The result was an innovative 
settlement agreement that not only awarded unpaid wages, but also insti-
tuted policy changes involving paid vacations, sick leave, and some meas-
ure of job security.69 
Just as litigation has promoted collective action in the workers’ rights 
context, it has also been used to shield worker organizing from repressive 
responses.  The use of litigation to protect activists punished for engaging 
in civil disobedience has a long tradition in the civil rights, antiwar, and la-
bor movements.  In the context of day labor organizing, litigation has been 
necessary to strike down laws criminalizing the very act of seeking work.  
Over the last ten years, a number of localities in California have passed or-
dinances making it illegal to congregate in public for the purpose of solicit-
ing work, on the ground that such activities constitute a public nuisance.  In 
response, activists from the National Day Laborer Organizing Network 
have launched protest campaigns, but have also strategically enlisted public 
interest lawyers from the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund and the 
ACLU to challenge anti-solicitation ordinances on First Amendment 
grounds.70  These suits have resulted in courts striking down ordinances in 
Los Angeles County, Redondo Beach, and Glendale, thus preserving the 
ability of day laborers to earn a living.71 
The workers’ rights movement has also witnessed innovative efforts to 
combine litigation and organizing to promote enforcement of legal protec-
tions.  One of the most prominent enforcement campaigns grew out of ac-
tivism in the Los Angeles garment industry in the late 1990s, during a time 
when nearly two-thirds of the city’s garment contractors were violating 
wage-and-hour regulations—underpaying workers by over $70 million per 
year.72  A group of lawyers from the Asian Pacific American Legal Center 
initiated an impact litigation campaign targeting prominent manufacturers 
and retailers who controlled, and benefited from, sweatshop contractors.  
The resulting public outrage supported policy and grassroots organizing ef-
forts, which in turn led to the enactment of state legislation holding gar-
 
 69. Id. at 1916. 
 70. Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of 
the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 490-91 (2005-2006). 
 71. Id. at 493-95. 
 72. EDNA BONACICH & RICHARD P. APPELBAUM, BEHIND THE LABEL: INEQUALITY IN THE 
LOS ANGELES APPAREL INDUSTRY 3 (2000). 
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ment manufacturers liable for abuses by their sweatshop contractors.73  The 
activists knew that the law’s passage would not automatically end labor 
abuse without a strong enforcement effort.  To promote legal compliance, 
they therefore established the Garment Worker Center, which provided di-
rect assistance to individual workers filing wage-and-hour claims pro se 
and referred workers with more complicated cases to lawyers for full repre-
sentation.  The goal was both to keep pressure on garment contractors to 
comply with the law and to promote further community activism.  How-
ever, activists found that even with this stepped up enforcement program, 
employers were still refusing to pay, betting that the time, expense, and ag-
gravation of enforcing judgments would cause workers to settle for less 
than they were owed.74  In the face of such resistance, another group of 
lawyers, with seed money from the Echoing Green Foundation, founded 
the Wage Justice Center, a project dedicated solely to enforcing judgments 
the garment industry and other low-wage sectors.  With the goal of giving 
“low-income workers the same power to collect their wages as commercial 
entities have to collect their claims against other businesses,” the Center 
has taken low-wage worker cases on referral and successfully pursued col-
lection strategies borrowed from business litigation.75  Although these ef-
forts have by no means eliminated enforcement challenges in the garment 
sector, they show how lawyers and activists can use multiple tactics to 
mount a coordinated response. 
2. Litigation Across Diverse Practice Sites 
The second lesson from the literature on law and social change relates to 
the way money influences legal advocacy.  Although funding constraints 
are most explicit in the context of federal support for civil legal assistance, 
they operate across all practice sites, and shape the dockets of public inter-
est organizations, law firm pro bono programs, private public interest law 
firms, and law school clinical programs.  Understanding these constraints 
enables us to think strategically about which organizations offer the most 
promising contexts for different types of cases. 
 
 73. Cummings, Hemmed In, supra note 40. 
 74. Id. (referring to a report stating that, five years after the law’s enactment, workers 
were recovering on average less than one-third of the total amount of unpaid wages and sel-
dom were receiving any liquidated damages or penalties authorized by statute). 
 75. The Wage Justice Center, Waging Justice for Exploited Workers, 
http://www.wagejustice.org/advocating-low-income-workers-rights.html (last visited June 
23, 2009); The Wage Justice Center, Wage Justice Delivered, http://www.wagejustice.org/ 
wage-claim-success-stories.html (last visited June 23, 2009) (reporting that the Center 
helped to recover $100,000 for five garment workers who had been unable to collect a 
judgment by the California Labor Commissioner in 2005). 
CUMMINGS_RHODE_CHRISTENSEN 6/23/2009  5:36:22 PM 
620 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
a. Legal Services 
No public interest institution has been more vulnerable to funding re-
strictions than the federal legal services program.76  The political backlash 
to the early law reform agenda of the legal services program brought sig-
nificant budget cuts that resulted in a 50% decline in federal funding for le-
gal aid between 1980 and 2003.77  In addition, the government has steadily 
curtailed the advocacy of legal services lawyers by prohibiting an array of 
activities, including most lobbying and organizing efforts, class action and 
fee-generating lawsuits, representation of prisoners and undocumented in-
dividuals, and litigation related to welfare reform.78  Most drastically, this 
legislation prohibited lawyers in federally funded organizations from using 
non-federal funds to engage in any of the banned activities.79 
The impact of these restrictions has been dramatic.  Some organizations 
chose to forgo federal aid to avoid the restrictions and many legal aid law-
yers left organizations that continued to receive federal funds.  Until the re-
cent recession, overall financial support for civil legal aid remained rela-
tively stable due to the increase in funding from other sources, such as 
Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts, foundation grants, and private lawyer 
contributions.80  However, the reliance on these revenue sources has in-
creased the time and effort that legal aid programs need to devote to fund-
raising at the expense of other substantive activities.  The diversification of 
funding sources has also required programs to structure activities in ways 
that will attract private or foundation support, sometimes at the expense of 
more urgent programmatic priorities.81  Moreover, the reduction of federal 
support has made legal services to the poor deeply vulnerable to market 
fluctuations, reducing aid at precisely the moments that low-income people 
 
 76. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, supra note 5, at 130; see also EARL JOHNSON, 
JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 
188-91 (1978). 
 77. ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (2003). 
 78. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act § 504(a) (1996). 
 79. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1610.1-1610.9 (1997). 
 80. As of 2005, LSC funds constituted only about one-third of the total legal services 
budget in the United States, with state and local government funds contributing about one-
third, Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts about 10%, foundations about 7%, and private 
lawyers roughly 4%.  ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM IN 2005, at 4 (2005), available at http://www.clasp.org/ 
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 81. See Rhode, Public Interest Law, supra note 3, at 2056-58 (providing a general dis-
cussion of these effects on public interest organizations, including those that serve low-
income clients). 
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need it the most—a problem underscored by the current economic down-
turn.82 
By design, the substantive restrictions on legal services advocacy have 
undermined the effectiveness of legal services programs in bringing impact 
litigation or engaging in political tactics likely to result in systemic reform.  
In particular, the restriction on class actions and fee-generating cases pre-
vents legal services lawyers from pursuing large-scale resource-intensive 
lawsuits, while withdrawing an important bargaining chip against defen-
dants who can litigate without the threat of a large fee payout.  Proposed 
federal legislation would increase funding for legal services back to 1980 
levels and remove many of the programmatic restrictions, including the ban 
on class actions and attorney’s fees.83  Without such reforms, federally-
funded legal aid organizations will remain severely constrained in efforts to 
pursue systemic justice through litigation. 
b. Pro Bono 
The decline in the federal legal services program has been met by the 
rise in pro bono—indeed, the two have been sometimes linked.  Opponents 
of the reformist agenda of legal services championed pro bono as an acceptable 
alternative, knowing that it would not pose a comparable threat to business inter-
ests.  This linkage was codified in the early 1980s in a program known as “pri-
vate attorney involvement,” which earmarks a portion of federal funding to 
programs that recruit and train pro bono volunteers.  As a result, the num-
ber of such programs over the past quarter century has increased from 
about fifty to roughly 900, and lawyer participation constitutes an estimated 
one-quarter to one-third of full-time equivalent lawyer staff within the en-
tire U.S. civil legal aid system.84 
Other factors also have encouraged expansion of the pro bono system, 
including the growth of large firms, which contributed over 3.5 million 
hours of pro bono services in 2005 (up nearly 80% from 1998); the support 
of the organized bar for increased pro bono in response to declining federal 
resources; the emergence of media ranking structures, which make contri-
bution levels more transparent and more important in recruitment and pub-
lic relations; the growing use of unpaid cases to train associates as mentor-
 
 82. See Marcia Coyle, FDIC, Heeding Attorneys, Heads off a Potential IOLTA Disaster, 
NAT’L L.J., Dec. 1, 2008; Bill Myers, Economic Collapse Will Affect Legal Aid to Poor, 
WASH. EXAMINER, Feb. 16, 2009. 
 83. See Brennan Center for Justice, Civil Access to Justice Act of 2009, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/civil_access_to_justice_act_of_2009. 
 84. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-Style Civil Legal 
Assistance, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 79, 85 (2007). 
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ing in paid work declines; and the cultural pressure for firms to give back 
during periods of financial success.85  The recent economic downturn has 
also encouraged many large firms to expand their programs as a way to 
provide valuable professional experiences for lawyers or new recruits who 
lack sufficient paid work.86 
The rise of pro bono as a delivery structure creates a distinct set of op-
portunities and constraints for public interest litigation.  Law firm pro bono 
programs are able to take on cases where federally funded legal services 
programs cannot, and have the resources to handle complex, discovery-
intensive lawsuits that would overwhelm the staffs of nonprofit groups.87  
Law firms also underwrite litigation that supplements legal services in key 
areas such as immigration and civil rights.  Yet the reliance on pro bono ef-
forts also raises important distributional and quality concerns.  Certain cat-
egories of cases are less likely to receive attention because of firms’ bot-
tom-line considerations.  In particular, positional conflicts of interest often 
prevent firms from taking cases that could antagonize corporate clients.88  
Thus, labor, employment, and consumer claims are unlikely to receive sig-
nificant support from firms that regularly defend business clients in these 
areas.  Legal services and public interest groups that rely on volunteers may 
find that difficult clients and unpopular causes too often fall through the 
cracks.89  In joking with his firm’s managing partners about the issue, one 
lawyer catalogued all the cases against powerful business and government 
clients that positional conflict policies prevented and concluded, “pretty 
soon the only people we are going to be able to represent are the poor 
against other poor people.”90 
 
 85. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, supra note 5, at 5; see also Steven A. Boutch-
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Another significant constraint involves the inability of most pro bono 
lawyers to connect cases to broader social reform or political organizing 
efforts.  Few of these lawyers have the time to gain the substantive expertise 
and familiarity with the major players in the field that are necessary to meet the 
long-range goals of client groups.  Rather, firm lawyers often use pro bono 
cases to train themselves.  There is, of course, an irony in this: underserved cli-
ents are asked to accept pro bono lawyers seeking to hone their skills, which 
are then deployed on behalf of private clients, often in the pursuit of contrary 
ends. 
c. Private Public Interest Law Firms 
When public interest groups are unable to find large firm pro bono assis-
tance in impact litigation, they frequently turn to smaller plaintiff-side 
firms, which rely on attorney’s fees to underwrite their services.  These 
private public interest law firms have positioned themselves as an alternate 
site for “doing well by doing good.”  They support resource-intensive im-
pact litigation that nonprofit groups cannot afford to pursue on their own, 
and that large firm pro bono programs will not pursue because of conflicts 
of interest.  No systematic data on these firms are available, but some evi-
dence suggests that they have grown in number.  Handler and his col-
leagues identified approximately twenty private firms in the late 1970s.91  
A recent compilation of private public interest and plaintiff’s firms put the 
number at over 200.92  Although this recent list includes firms involved in 
personal injury and commercial matters, the majority pursue cases that 
have analogues in the non-profit sector, such as employment and civil 
rights.93 
The evolution of private public interest law firms reflects distinctive 
structural opportunities and constraints.  On the opportunity side, the use of 
the class action form and the availability of fee-shifting statutes and contin-
gency fees have permitted cause-oriented lawyers to build powerful litiga-
tion practices around issues such as employment and housing discrimina-
tion, wage-and-hour violations, human rights, and police abuse.  For many 
of these attorneys, private practice avoids the problems associated with 
 
 91. JOEL F. HANDLER ET AL., LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978). 
 92. CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW AT COLUMBIA LAW SCH. & BERNARD KOTEEN OFFICE 
OF PUB. INTEREST ADVISING AT HARVARD LAW SCH., PRIVATE PUBLIC INTEREST AND PLAIN-
TIFF’S FIRM GUIDE (2008). 
 93. Cummings & Southworth, Between Profit and Principle, supra note 5, at 19. Other 
common specialties involve environmental and consumer law.  Id. 
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some nonprofit organizations, such as low salaries, fundraising obligations, 
the lack of training, and scarce resources for large-scale litigation.94 
Another important advantage of private public interest firms is auton-
omy.95  In studies of such firms, lawyers often emphasize the ability to set 
their own priorities as one of the most attractive features of their practice.  
For instance, lawyers at the Washington, D.C.-based Bernabei & Katz 
started their civil rights firm in order to “maximize discretion to select cas-
es” consistent with their own political goals.96  The desire for such auton-
omy seems true of lawyers on the right as well as left.  Southworth’s study 
of socially conservative and libertarian lawyers found that small firm prac-
tice accommodated individuals who wanted “practices reflecting their po-
litical commitments.”97 
Yet the autonomy of lawyers in private public interest firms is also con-
strained by financial imperatives, which often force tradeoffs between mis-
sion and money.  These firms are typically small, often less than ten law-
yers, and risky, because they generally lack a stable of repeat clients.  
Many struggle financially, and the unpredictability in revenue streams con-
strains their ability to handle more than a few large-scale cases or matters 
outside the most profitable fields.  To be sure, many firms hedge finan-
cially riskier cases against ones that promise a strong likelihood of recov-
ery, leaving some room for cases on behalf of low-income clients.  How-
ever, the constant concern about fee generation creates incentives to screen 
out meritorious but low-value cases.  In this sense, the litigation agenda of 
private public interest firms is driven by the delicate balance between profit 
and principle, which different firms handle in different ways.  Some pursue 
only work that partners believe in—and sacrifice income to do so.98  The 
lawyers at Bernabei & Katz—which accepted civil rights, civil liberties, 
employment discrimination, whistleblower, and prisoners’ rights claims—
refused to take cases for purely financial reasons and paid its attorneys on a 
nonprofit scale.  Many firms, however, supplement their mission-driven 
work with other matters that are at least consistent with their commitments, 
if not their priorities.  Still other firms take cases that do not further any 
 
 94. See Rhode, Public Interest Law, supra note 3, at 2059-60. 
 95. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 4, at 88. 
 96. Debra S. Katz & Lynne Bernabei, Practicing Public Interest Law in a Private Pub-
lic Interest Law Firm: The Ideal Setting to Challenge the Power, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 293, 
296 (1994). 
 97. Ann Southworth, Professional Identity and Political Commitment Among Lawyers 
for Conservative Causes, in THE WORLDS THAT CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE, supra note 36, at 
96. 
 98. Katz & Bernabei, supra note 96. 
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core values but subsidize other work that does.99  Resource constraints 
shape the course as well as type of litigation.  Some private public interest 
firm attorneys report being financially outmatched by large firm opponents, 
which can skew strategic and settlement decisions.100 
Finally, these firms’ dependence on the private market works against in-
novative high risk efforts and the development of strong ties to political 
movements.  Although private public interest firms do sometimes take pro 
bono work, their economic model is generally inconsistent with pursuing 
claims primarily for their impact on organizing or policy campaigns.  As a 
result, these firms are unlikely to be tightly integrated with, and account-
able to, social movements.  Lawyers in private public interest firms there-
fore confront an important tradeoff: although they generally remain free of 
government and foundation influence, they are dependent on paid work in 
ways that may limit political collaboration and risk-taking. 
d. Law School Clinics 
Law school clinics constitute another important (and under-explored) 
site of public interest litigation.  The clinical movement, which began in 
tandem with public interest law in the 1970s, occupies a paradoxical space 
within law schools: firmly institutionalized but frequently marginalized.  Its 
institutional presence is powerful: in 1999, the AALS Section on Clinical 
Legal Education’s database showed 183 law schools with clinics staffed by 
over 1700 professors.101  A recent study by the Center for the Study of Ap-
plied Legal Education found that there were over 800 in-house, live client 
clients in U.S. law schools, in areas that cut across a range of substantive 
public interest issues including children’s rights, immigration, housing, 
human rights, disability, employment, civil rights, consumer, family, and 
environmental law.102  Clinical programs have thus developed into substan-
tial providers of legal services.  And the pressure to expand these programs 
is strong.  Law students generally report receiving great value from their 
clinical experiences and law schools recognize the need for courses that 
will attract top students interested in experiential learning and public ser-
 
 99. Stuart Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering: Practice Sites 
and the Politicization of the Professional, 5 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 246 (1998). 
 100. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, supra note 5, at 134. 
 101. Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education for This Millennium: The Third 
Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 30 (2000). 
 102. DAVID A. SANTACROCE & ROBERT R. KUEHN, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED LE-
GAL EDUC., REPORT ON THE 2007–2008 SURVEY 8. 
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vice practice.103  In addition, as law schools try to adapt their curricula to 
meet the challenges of the contemporary profession, they see clinics as a 
valuable way to link analytic approaches with practical applications.104 
Yet as is clear from an ongoing controversy over law school accredita-
tion standards, the institutional status of clinicians remains a significant is-
sue.105  Many lack the security and status that come with tenure.106  The 
Center for the Study of Applied Legal Education survey reported that near-
ly two-thirds of respondent clinicians had contractual appointments, or 
served as adjuncts, staff attorneys, or fellows; just over 10% were on a clin-
ical tenure track, while just under a quarter were on an academic tenure 
track.107  For those in charge of in-house, live-client clinics, the proportion 
of non-tenure track (clinical or academic) appointments is even larger.108  
One reason for the status disparity is financial.  Clinical education requires 
intensive supervision, which is correspondingly expensive.  Cost con-
straints often drive schools to avoid dedicating more expensive ladder-track 
lines for clinicians, choosing instead to reserve them for those whose scho-
larly reputations may bring national attention (and enhance law school 
rankings).109  And law schools are often reluctant to guarantee adequate re-
sources for skills-based instruction.  As federal funding has eroded over the 
past decade, clinical programs have scrambled to supplement institutional 
funding with periodic grants from foundations, corporations, and individual 
donors.110  However, clinicians report deep frustration with financial con-
straints, citing the lack of hard money, insufficient staffing and office 
 
 103. THE NALP FOUNDATION FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH AND EDUCATION & THE AMER-
ICAN BAR FOUNDATION, AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CA-
REERS 81 (2004). 
 104. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). 
 105. Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution of ABA Standards for Clinical Fac-
ulty, 75 TENN. L. REV. 183 (2008). 
 106. Barry et al., supra note 101, at 31 (of nearly 800 clinicians reporting on their status 
in 1999, slightly more than 40% stated that they either had tenure or were on the tenure-
track). 
 107. SANTACROCE & KUEHN, supra note 102, at 29. 
 108. Id. at 15. 
 109. Clinical instructors, who frequently come from non-profit organizations in search of 
opportunities to do the same cause-oriented work with higher salaries and better working 
conditions, may not initially perceive disparate status as a problem and students may not be 
attuned to how status disparities may impact their educational experience. 
 110. Barry et al., supra note 99, at 19-20 (during the 1980s and 1990s, the Federal De-
partment of Education spent nearly $90 million to support the expansion of clinical educa-
tion). 
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space, and lack of administrative and secretarial support as major chal-
lenges.111 
Litigation efforts within clinics play out against these status and finan-
cial disparities, which vary across institutional context.  At some law 
schools, clinical programs have resources that rival their non-academic 
public interest counterparts and clinical faculty receive equal—or near-
equal—treatment to non-clinical faculty.112  With resources and security, 
clinicians may be willing to take on larger and more controversial cases 
without fearing negative repercussions; clinicians with less support and 
stability may be less able to assume such risks.  As an example, faculty at 
law schools with relatively well-funded and institutionally integrated clini-
cal programs have worked on prominent cases representing Guantánamo 
detainees, challenging the legality of New York’s workers’ compensation 
system, and supporting undocumented immigrant workers’ struggle for bet-
ter employment conditions. 
Yet even within well-supported programs, the mission and structure of 
clinical education impose significant challenges to social impact litigation.  
Clinicians need to select cases based on pedagogical value and to accom-
modate students’ schedules, time commitments, and level of experience.113  
The need for discrete assignments that can be parceled out during the 
course of a semester works against taking on intensive litigation with heavy 
resource demands and unpredictable timing.  Many clinical faculty, particu-
larly those on a tenure track, are expected to publish scholarly articles, 
which creates incentives to curtail or delegate client supervision in order to 
protect research time.  Controversial litigation can also pose problems for 
schools, which can be threatened with the loss of state funding or the with-
drawal of private donors who disagree with a clinic’s political goals.  Over 
the last decade, several prominent clinics have become embroiled in con-
troversies that sapped resources and imposed restrictions on student repre-
sentation.114  Finally, many institutions are under increasing pressure to of-
fer skills instruction more responsive to the demands of private practice, in 
 
 111. SANTACROCE & KUEHN, supra note 102, at 12. 
 112. At Georgetown, for instance, the clinical program includes twelve free standing clin-
ics with seventeen full-time faculty, twenty-six graduate student fellows, and several adjunct 
instructors.  See Georgetown University Law Center, Law Center Clinical Program, 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/clinics/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). 
 113. Sameer Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 
410-11 (2008); Juliet Brodie, Little Cases on the Middle Ground, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 332, 
353 (forthcoming 2009). 
 114. Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access 
to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REV. 235, 237-40 (1999). 
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areas like business transactions, intellectual property, and securities law.  
Investment in these fields often diverts resources from social justice causes. 
As this overview suggests, the major sites of public interest litigation 
each confront distinctive opportunities and limitations.  For those seeking 
social impact through law, the challenge is to think more strategically about 
the comparative capacities of particular forums.  To that end, the literature 
on strategic philanthropy offers some relevant insights. 
II.  STRATEGIC PHILANTHROPY 
A. The Strategic Giving Framework 
1. The Rationale for Strategic Frameworks 
An increasing proportion of public interest legal work is financed 
through philanthropic contributions, either pro bono time and money do-
nated by private lawyers, or grants from foundations and corporate spon-
sors.  In Rhode’s recent study of the nation’s leading public interest legal 
organizations, foundations typically accounted for about one-third of their 
budgets, individual donations for just over a quarter, and corporate contri-
butions for about 14%.115  About four-fifths of these organizations also re-
ported substantial collaboration with pro bono counsel, particularly for ma-
jor litigation.116  In addition, many lawyers also contribute time and money 
directly to social impact work.  Taken together, these contributions are 
quite substantial.  The nation’s 200 largest firms alone report time valued at 
$1.45 billion annually.117  Yet participants in public interest legal activities 
are often strikingly unstrategic in their giving.  Many operate with a “spray 
and pray” approach, which spreads assistance on multiple projects with the 
hope that something good will come of it.118  Something usually does, but 
the result is not necessarily the most cost-effective use of resources. 
Paul Brest, former Stanford law professor, and now President of the 
Hewlett Foundation, likes to remind organizations that “[i]f you don’t 
know where you’re going, any road will get you there.”119  Lawyers’ deci-
 
 115. Rhode, Public Interest Law, supra note 3, at 2054. 
 116. Id. at 2070 (47% reported extensive and 33% reported moderate collaboration). 
 117. Aric Press, In-House at the American Lawyer, AM. LAW., July 2008, at 13 (basing 
calculation on blended rate of $300 per hour). 
 118. PETER FRUMKIN, STRATEGIC GIVING:  THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PHILANTHROPY 371 
(2006).  For an analysis of the problems of self-interest facing public interest lawyers, see 
Rhode, Rethinking the Public, supra note 89. 
 119. PAUL BREST & HAL HARVEY, MONEY WELL SPENT: A STRATEGIC GUIDE FOR SMART 
PHILANTHROPY 35 (2008). 
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sion-making often lacks that sense of direction.  Many have not thought 
deeply about their objectives or attempted to assess the social impact of 
their contributions.120  When the amounts of assistance are small, such an 
ad hoc approach is not particularly problematic; attempts at systematic as-
sessment would not be worth the effort.  But many individuals and institu-
tions that make major contributions are motivated at least in part by a de-
sire to give back to the community, to build a more just society, and to 
make a difference on issues that have affected them personally.121  The ob-
jectives of these donors would benefit from a more systematic framework.  
Esther Lardent, President of the Pro Bono Institute, notes that too much of 
lawyers’ charitable assistance is random and episodic.122  What is needed 
are approaches that are strategic: informed, sustained, collaborative, and 
accountable.123  Those approaches could benefit from the growing literature 
on strategic philanthropy. 
2. The Strategic Process 
What exactly qualifies as strategic philanthropy and how much it differs 
from major foundations’ longstanding practices is a matter of dispute.124  
 
 120. See Rhode, Rethinking the Public, supra note 89, at 1445 (quoting representative 
senior partner’s comment that the firm was unable to assess the social impact of its work); 
Gary Blasi, Framing Access to Justice: Beyond Perceived Justice for Individuals, 42 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 61-62, on file with author) (noting the fre-
quent absence of evidence for Legal Aid lawyers’ sense of effectiveness). 
 121. See RHODE, supra note 5, at 62 (2005); see also ROBERT COLES, THE CALL OF SER-
VICE 91 (1993); Gil Clary & Mark Snyder, A Functional Analysis of Altruism and Pro So-
cial Behavior: The Case of Volunteerism, in PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 119, 125-26 (Margaret 
Clark ed., 1991); THE CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY, IND. UNIV., 2008 STUDY OF HIGH NET WORTH 
PHILANTHROPY: ISSUES DRIVING CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES AMONG AFFLUENT HOUSEHOLDS 
(2009); MICHAEL L. GROSS, ETHICS AND ACTIVISM: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POLITI-
CAL MORALITY 128-32 (1997). 
 122. Esther Lardent, President of the Pro Bono Inst., Comment at UCLA Conference on 
the Future of Pro Bono (Oct. 3, 2008). 
 123. Id.; see also Rhode, Rethinking the Public, supra note 89, at 1447. 
 124. For a claim that the term “strategy” has become so overused to describe any grant 
with a purpose that the term is almost meaningless, see Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kra-
mer, Philanthropy’s New Agenda: Creating Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 
121, 125 [hereinafter Porter & Kramer, Philanthropy’s New Agenda].  For a claim that vir-
tually all foundations claim to practice some form of strategic philanthropy, see Mark R. 
Kramer, Strategic Confusion, FOUND. NEWS & COMMENT., May–June 2001, at 40.  For a 
suggestion that whether strategic philanthropy involves a new concept or just new terminol-
ogy is less relevant than whether it makes a difference, see Peter Karoff, Saturday Morning, 
in JUST MONEY: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 3, 13 (Peter Ka-
roff ed., 2004) [hereinafter JUST MONEY].  For an argument that the practice of strategic phi-
lanthropy isn’t all that different, see Joel L. Fleishman, Simply Doing Good or Doing Good 
Well: Stewardship, Hubris, and Foundation Governance, in JUST MONEY, supra at 104; Pe-
ter Frumkin, Inside Venture Philanthropy, SOC’Y, May–June 2003, at 7, 15; Stanley M. 
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Most experts agree, however, on two distinguishing features of strategic 
giving: clarity in objectives and specific measures of performance.125  Un-
like “mission driven” charity, which furthers a broadly stated organiza-
tional purpose (such as reducing poverty), strategic philanthropy demands a 
well-supported plan for achieving measurable goals.  That plan needs to in-
clude means of tracking progress toward its goals and comparing the costs, 
benefits, and risks of any particular approach against other methods of 
achieving the same ends.126 
Two strands of strategic philanthropy have particular relevance for pub-
lic interest law.  One involves the trend among large corporations to target 
charitable contributions in ways that serve business as well as societal in-
terests.  In its most effective form, such strategic giving both draws on the 
organization’s distinctive resources and appeals to its particular stake-
holders.  For example, information technology companies contribute 
equipment to non-profits, and subsidize distance-learning programs for IT 
workers around the globe.127  The closest analogy in the legal profession 
involves “signature” pro bono initiatives, which build on law firms’ sub-
stantive specialties and align philanthropic goals with training, recruitment, 
and retention objectives.128 
 
Katz, What Does it Mean to Say that Philanthropy is Effective?  The Philanthropists’ New 
Clothes, 149 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 123, 126 (2005), available at http://www.aps-
pub.com/proceedings/1492/490201.pdf. 
 125. BREST & HARVEY, supra note 119, at 7; Porter & Kramer, Philanthropy’s New 
Agenda, supra note 124, at 126-27. 
 126. BREST & HARVEY, supra note 119, at 59; Paul Brest, Strategic Philanthropy and its 
Malcontents, in MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, 
AND POLICY 229, 230-31 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006) [hereinafter MORAL LEADERSHIP]; 
see also Kramer, supra note 124, at 44 (describing key elements of strategic philanthropy as 
identifying the desired change, clarifying internal values and strengths, and ascertaining ex-
ternal needs). 
 127. John V. Kania, Found. Strategy Group, Benchmarking Philanthropy, PERSP. CORP. 
PHILANTHROPY, Winter, 2004, at 1, 2-3 (describing Microsoft signature initiatives); John V. 
Kania & Mindy W. Oakley, Found. Strategy Group, Design for Giving: Understanding 
What Motivates Corporate Philanthropy, PERSP. CORP. PHILANTHROPY, Winter, 2003 at 1 
(describing Cisco Networking Academy); Michael A. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Com-
petitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 57, 61, 64 
(describing Cisco and Apple projects) [hereinafter Porter & Kramer, Competitive Advan-
tage].  For other examples, see Michelle Courton Brown, Making The Case for Corporate 
Philanthropy: Key Element of Success, in JUST MONEY, supra note 124, at 151 (describing 
banks’ efforts to bridge the digital divide and expand online banking services to low and 
moderate income communities); Keith Epstein, Philanthropy, Inc.: How Today’s Corporate 
Donors Want Their Gifts to Help the Bottom Line, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 
2005, at 21 (describing missile manufacturer’s support of local engineering and science 
education programs). 
 128. RHODE, supra note 5, at 30-31 (2005); Rhode, Rethinking the Public, supra note 89, 
at 1442 (describing the “bottom line” orientation in many firms). 
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A second form of strategic giving involves venture philanthropy.  This 
approach, modeled after venture capitalism, helps high-potential non-profit 
organizations scale up to a point where they can sustain major social im-
pact work.129  This entails sufficient engagement and management assis-
tance to promote organizational growth, capacity, and continued financial 
viability.130  The closest analogy for the legal profession involves long-
term pro bono collaborations between law firms and public interest groups, 
which can include significant financial support and assistance as general 
counsel, along with participation in particular legal projects.131  Unlike ven-
ture philanthropists, however, who often look for an exit strategy after the 
initial investment, firms generally cultivate an ongoing relationship. 
What unites these different forms of strategic philanthropy is a well-
designed process for developing and evaluating a plan of action.  To 
achieve social impact, a strategic plan needs a theory of how to achieve the 
desired result, an approach that is within the capacity of the project, and 
criteria for measuring progress.132  Ideally, as Brest notes, the theory should 
be “empirically validated.”133  At the very least, it should be informed by 
the best available research on what works in the field, or confidence that 
the organization being supported has that base of knowledge.  For many 
social problems, the most effective strategy is to address its root causes, ra-
ther than just alleviate its symptoms.134 
Experts describe several stages of the strategic process.  The first is 
“scoping,” in which the philanthropist reviews factors such as research and 
expert opinions on the nature of the problem; the views of those who would 
benefit from assistance; the relative costs, benefits, and risks of potential 
solutions; the experiences of other groups that have worked on the issue; 
and any unique capabilities of the philanthropist.135  In effect, the key ques-
tion is where and how the donor can have the greatest effect on the dynam-
ics that perpetuate the problem.136  A second stage involves developing a 
 
 129. BREST & HARVEY, supra note 119, at 195; Frumkin, supra note 124, at 9. 
 130. See HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 11, at 9; Karoff, supra note 124, at 
3, 13. 
 131. Rhode, Public Interest Law, supra note 3, at 2074. 
 132. Brest, supra note 126, at 233. 
 133. Id. 
 134. John A Byrne, The New Face of Philanthropy, BUS. WK., Dec. 2, 2002, at 82; Hal 
Harvey & Barbara Mertz, Problem Solving Philanthropy (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). 
 135. Bill & MELINDA GATES FOUND., STRATEGY LIFECYCLE OVERVIEW AND GUIDE 6-7 
(2008), available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/about/Documents/strategy-lifecycle-
overview-and-guide-2008.pdf. 
 136. Byrne, supra note 134, at 82; Kramer, supra note 124, at 6. 
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specific strategy, identifying potential collaborators, and establishing crite-
ria for measuring outcomes and long-term impact.137  Once a philanthropist 
has made a commitment, the third stage of the process involves evaluating 
progress, and modifying the strategy in light of experience. 
The most difficult and divisive aspect of this framework concerns the 
choice of “measurable outcomes” to use for assessment.  Some strategic 
philanthropy, again borrowing from business models, attempts to quantify 
the social return on investment (“SROI”).  In essence, the process estimates 
the social impact of an organization’s project, adjusted by the likelihood of 
achieving it, in relation to the amount invested.138  In 1996, the Roberts En-
terprise Development Fund pioneered the concept as a way to attach mone-
tary value to “social purposes enterprises” that attempted to move disad-
vantaged employees out of poverty.139  By calculating the savings from 
social services when workers became self- sufficient, along with tax reve-
nues generated by the businesses, the framework found a highly positive 
return from the original project investment.  Building on that framework, a 
cottage industry has developed to quantify the social benefits of non-profit 
initiatives.140 
3. The Challenges for Strategic Philanthropy 
In principle, the virtues of strategic philanthropy are self-evident.  Eve-
ryone benefits when money is well spent, not just well intentioned.  De-
manding measurable social impact is particularly important in contexts 
where other forms of accountability are lacking, as is typically the case in 
 
 137. BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., supra note 135, at 7-9; see also Porter & Kramer, 
supra note 124, at 129-30 (describing the need for foundations to engage in systematic re-
search, learn from prior efforts, and identify its unique capacities); V. Kasturi Rangan, Lofty 
Missions, Down–to-Earth Plans, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2004, at 1 (describing necessity 
and examples of development of specific strategies); Rebecca W. Rimel, Strategic Philan-
thropy: Pew’s Approach to Matching Needs with Resources, HEALTH AFF., May–June 1999, 
at 229-30 (describing strategic process of Pew Charitable Trusts). 
 138. See BREST & HARVEY, supra note 119, at 153; Alison Lingane & Sara Olsen, Guide-
lines for Social Return on Investment, 46 CAL. MGMT REV. 116 (2004). 
 139. CYNTHIA GAIR, ROBERTS ENTER. DEV. FUND, A REPORT FROM THE GOOD SHIP SROI 
(2005), available at http://www.redf.org/learn-from-redf/publications/119 (scroll to bottom 
of page to find link to .pdf file, username and password is required).  For the evolution of 
this model, see Carla I. Javits, REDF’s Current Approach to SROI, May, 2008, available at 
http://www.redf.org/publications-sroi.htm (scroll to bottom of page to find link to .pdf file, 
username and password is required). 
 140. JACK QUARTER ET AL., WHAT COUNTS: SOCIAL ACCOUNTING FOR NONPROFITS AND 
COOPERATIVES 65-69 (2003); John Sawhill & David Williamson, Measuring What Matters 
in Nonprofits, MCKINSEY Q., May 2001, at 98; Lisa Sanfilippo, New Econ. Found., Measur-
ing Real Value: A DIY Guide to Social Return on Investment, http://www.lsbu.ac.uk/bcim/ 
cgcm/conferences/serc/2007/speakers/sanfilippo-serc-2007a.ppt (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
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philanthropic contexts, including lawyers’ pro bono programs.141  In prac-
tice, however, even experts sympathetic to this strategic framework ques-
tion whether its rhetoric has outpaced its capacity.142 
A threshold difficulty involves identifying a theory of change for the 
major social problems that philanthropists, particularly in law, are inter-
ested in addressing.  These remain problems precisely because they defy 
simple solutions, and the causal dynamics of change are difficult to unpack 
with any certainty.  Determining how much particular strategies have 
helped reduce homelessness, homophobia, or similar social pathologies are 
matters on which even the most well informed experts disagree.143  Plausi-
ble theories frequently prove flawed in practice.144  Or it may be impossible 
to tell.  A program that does not succeed in some ambitious effort may still 
have prevented a worse result.145 
So too, what constitutes “success” may be open to dispute.  Many social 
initiatives have mixed results, and what one expert labels “philanthropy’s 
biggest mistakes” may look to others like partial victories.146  School de-
segregation litigation is a case in point.  It often leads both to white flight 
and financial starvation for inner city schools, but also to greater racial tol-
erance and community engagement on local educational policy.147  Much 
may turn on the time frame for evaluation.  For example, leading gay and 
lesbian rights organizations generally opposed the first wave of same-sex 
marriage lawsuits.148  Their concern was backlash, and their fears were not 
without foundation.  Court victories in several states were reversed by vot-
 
 141. For the absence of oversight in lawyers’ pro bono programs, see Deborah L. Rhode, 
Where is the Public in Lawyers’ Public Service?  Pro Bono and the Bottom Line (Aug. 28, 
2008) (unpublished essay), available at http://documentoleo.angelfire.com/Rhode_ 
Essay.pdf; see also discussion infra Part II.B.1.d.  For the lack of accountability in the phil-
anthropic sector, see Fleishman, supra note 124, at 114, 124. 
 142. See FRUMKIN, supra note 118, at 15; Karoff, supra note 124, at 13. 
 143. Kramer, supra note 124. 
 144. Megan Greenwall, New Way to Rate Charities Sought, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2000, 
at B1 (discussing example of where theories were wrong about what made domestic vio-
lence treatment and prevention programs effective); see also BREST & HARVEY, supra note 
119. 
 145. Steven A. Schroeder, When Execution Trumps Strategy, in JUST MONEY, supra note 
124, at 190 (describing the failed effort by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to reduce 
the number of individuals lacking health insurance, but noting that without the effort, the 
problem might have been worse). 
 146. BREST & HARVEY, supra note 119, at 278.  See generally MARTIN MORSE WOOSTER, 
HUDSON INST. & BRADLEY CTR. FOR PHILANTHROPY & CIVIC RENEWAL, GREAT PHILAN-
THROPIC MISTAKES (2006). 
 147. For the impact of Brown v. Board of Education, see BROWN AT FIFTY: THE UNFIN-
ISHED LEGACY (Charles Ogletree & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 2004). 
 148. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate, Addressing Disputes Among Group 
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1637-39 (1997). 
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ers and prompted statutes denying recognition to same-sex marriages.149  
Yet litigation also required an increasing number of states to permit gay 
and lesbian couples to marry or to enter domestic partnerships with compa-
rable benefits.150  Public support for those options has also grown dramati-
cally.151  It is impossible to know whether a different strategy would have 
been more effective in extending gay rights.  Moreover, as that example il-
lustrates, even the best laid strategies of major public interest organizations 
and their funders can be undermined by the actions of individual plaintiffs 
and politicians who force the issue into judicial or legislative forums before 
the necessary foundations are in place.152 
A second difficulty for strategic philanthropists is that not all outcomes 
can be accurately measured.  That is particularly the case in many public 
interest legal contexts.  How do we price due process?  Dennis Collins, 
former director of the Irvine Foundation, worries that strategic philanthropy 
encourages a “pseudo science” of “metrics and matrices” that cannot cap-
ture intangible values.”153  Bruce Sievers, former head of the Haas Family 
Foundation, similarly warns against what Alfred North Whitehead termed 
the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.”154  Even the strongest advocates of 
SROI frameworks acknowledge their inability to quantify all relevant out-
comes.155  In many contexts, philanthropists cannot help but suffer “meas-
urement angst;” they lack the research or methodology on which to make 
informed assessments of social impact.156 
 
 149. For an account of this history, see JANE SCHACTER, THE BACKLASH THAT WASN’T: 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY LITIGATION THEN AND NOW (forthcoming 2009); see also WILLIAM 
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 612 (2008). 
 150. For a list of states, see Same Sex Marriage, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/ 
cyf/samesex.htm (last visited May 12, 2009). 
 151. SCHACTER, supra note 149, at 56; Patrick Eagly et al., Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPIN-
ION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 235 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008). 
 152. The suit in Hawaii was brought by plaintiffs without the support of any major gay 
and lesbian rights organization.  See Rubenstein, supra note 148, at 1637.  The decision by 
San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsome to issue marriage licenses forced the issue into the 
courts before local gay and lesbian rights organizations thought it prudent.  For Newsome’s 
action, see Patrick Dillon & Lee Romney, S.F. Judge Won’t Halt Marriages: The City Gets 
Until March 29 to Return to Court and Defend the Merits of Allowing Same Sex Unions, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at A1. 
 153. Dennis Collins, The Art of Philanthropy, in JUST MONEY, supra note 124, at 64. 
 154. Bruce Sievers, Philanthropy’s Blindspot, in JUST MONEY, supra note 124, at 135; 
see also Bruce Sievers, Ethics and Philanthropy, in MORAL LEADERSHIP, supra note 126, at 
257. 
 155. QUARTER ET AL., supra note 140, at 81. 
 156. The phrase is Brown’s, based on her experience with Fleet bank initiatives.  Brown, 
supra note 127, at 160; see also Fleishman, supra note 124, at 118 (discussing the absence 
of research); WILLIAM & FLORA HEWLETT FOUND. & MCKINSEY & CO., THE NONPROFIT 
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Moreover, as experts like Peter Karoff of the Philanthropic Initiative 
have noted, insistence on objective performance measures can discourage 
funders and their grantees from taking on the “tough issues where success 
is hard to measure.”157  Philanthropists who demand measurable indicators 
of impact may be reluctant to “swing for the fences” on “complicated, mes-
sy, seemingly insoluble problems” where charitable funds and creativity 
are most needed.158 
A further concern is that if philanthropists insist on combining business 
and societal objectives, they risk having bottom-line concerns distort giving 
priorities.  A common criticism of corporate philanthropy is that too much 
money goes to publicizing good works rather than to the works them-
selves.159  Similar problems arise when law firms select pro bono projects 
more for their training and public relations potential than for their social 
impact.160  A related difficulty involves “signature projects” designed to 
brand the donor with a charitable cause.  These projects might be more ef-
fective if pursued in collaboration, but organizations intent on enhancing 
their reputation may not want partners who would share in the reflected 
glory.  At its worst, this mindset reflects a form of philanthropic hubris, in 
which donors delude themselves into believing their contributions alone are 
making a major dent on complex social problems.161 
A final concern arises when philanthropists want hands-on engagement 
with their grantees but lack the expertise to make that relationship mutually 
beneficial.162  Some nonprofits report that the process of working closely 
with donors is draining and unproductive.163  Yet if, as is often the case, 
 
MARKETPLACE: BRIDGING THE INFORMATION GAP IN PHILANTHROPY 1 (2008) (discussing the 
absence of any central repository for information about performance). 
 157. Peter Karoff, Introduction, in JUST MONEY, supra note 124, at xxii; see also Collins, 
supra note 153, at 65; Karoff, Saturday Morning, supra note 124, at 13; Sievers, supra note 
154, at 134. 
 158. Collins, supra note 153, at 65, 67. 
 159. Porter & Kramer, Competitive Advantage, supra note 127, at 57 (citing Philip Mor-
ris’s expenditure of $100 million to publicize a $75 million charitable campaign); Deborah 
L. Rhode, Where is the Leadership in Moral Leadership?, in MORAL LEADERSHIP, supra 
note 126, at 20 (noting that the demand for “value added” has pushed corporations to spend 
more on publicity than on what they are publicizing). 
 160. See infra note 199. 
 161. Fleishman, supra note 124, at 106. 
 162. BREST & HARVEY, supra note 119, at 200. 
 163. Frumkin, supra note 124, at 12; see also CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PHILANTHROPY, TO-
WARD A COMMON LANGUAGE: LISTENING TO FOUNDATION CEOS AND OTHER EXPERTS TALK 
ABOUT PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN PHILANTHROPY 12 (2002) (describing grantee per-
ception that foundation staff sometimes increase their workload without compensating bene-
fits, and foundation leaders’ acknowledgement of the inadequacy of efforts to monitor and 
respond to concerns). 
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funders do not seek bottom-up feedback from their grantees, those organi-
zations will be wary about volunteering it.  The result is to prevent candid 
dialogue that could make their collaborations more effective. 
4. Responding to the Challenges 
These are all real concerns.  But what is the alternative?  Social impact is 
often hard to predict and measure, but abandoning the effort would be no 
improvement.  All too often, leaders of philanthropic and non-profit or-
ganizations fall back on the claim that they just “don’t have the resources 
for in-depth evaluation.”164  But organizations have choices regarding 
where to spend the resources they do have and the failure to spend some of 
them on assessment compromises the value of funds invested in programs. 
A case history on point involves the Nature Conservancy.  Its mission is 
to preserve the diversity of plants and animals by protecting the habitats of 
endangered species.  For most of its history, the organization measured 
success by the amount of money it raised and the habitats it preserved.  By 
this “bucks and acres” metric, the Conservancy appeared to be highly suc-
cessful.  Its membership, contributions, and protected land all grew stead-
ily; by the turn of the twenty-first century, it had projects in twenty-eight 
countries, and had preserved some twelve million acres in the United States 
alone.165  Yet the diversity of species continued to decline, even within pro-
tected areas.  In-depth assessments revealed that survival rates depended on 
ecosystem preservation in bordering areas.  To be effective, the Conser-
vancy came to realize that it would need more multifaceted efforts focusing 
on issues such as economic development, pollution, and soil erosion.  That 
broader strategy was a tough sell to some donors, who were wedded to the 
aesthetic value of wilderness preservation.166  But a different approach was 
essential to achieving the organization’s biodiversity objectives. 
Of course, in some contexts, objective measures of progress will be 
much harder to come by.  It is, however, generally possible to identify 
some indicators or proxies.167  In legal contexts, these might include the 
number and satisfaction of individuals affected, the assessment of experts, 
and the impact on laws, policies, community empowerment, and social ser-
 
 164. Brown, supra note 127, at 160; see also WILLIAM & FLORA HEWLETT FOUND. & 
MCKINSEY & Co., supra note 156, at 14 (noting perceived incapacity of leanly staffed or-
ganizations to gather and act on performance information). 
 165. Sawhill & Williamson, supra note 140, at 100. 
 166. Id. at 101. 
 167. Brest, supra note 126, at 237, 243; Harvey & Mertz, supra note 134; see also WIL-
LIAM & FLORA HEWLETT FOUND. & MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 156, at 18 (noting value of 
proxy information such as views of stakeholders). 
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vices.  For complex problems, it often makes sense to pool resources and 
expertise through strategic alliances with other funders and nonprofit or-
ganizations.168  Another option is spread betting—distributing support over 
a wide range of approaches and organizations, and then periodically revis-
ing priorities in light of which investments prove most productive.169 
The effectiveness of all of these strategies is likely to increase if organi-
zations become more demanding in their evaluations and more willing to 
share information about what works and what does not.  To be sure, those 
who invest significant amounts of time and money in impact litigation want 
to feel good about their efforts, and are understandably reluctant to spend 
additional resources to identify possible flaws in their efforts.  That reluc-
tance is particularly easy to rationalize in legal contexts, where organiza-
tions can generally point to at least some positive outcomes.  Legal repre-
sentation is, after all, itself a value.  And what leader of a public interest 
organization or pro bono program wants to rain on the parade when it 
might jeopardize support for their work?  But sometimes at least a light 
drizzle is essential to further progress.  In addition, philanthropists need fo-
rums in which they can candidly share their experiences and prod each oth-
er to do better. 
B. Lessons for Lawyers 
For lawyers who seek social impact, strategic philanthropy holds several 
lessons.  The first is the importance of clear goals and specific measures of 
progress.  In essence, decision makers need to determine how they can use 
resources most effectively, given their distinctive concerns and capabilities.  
At a minimum, a strategic approach needs processes for: 
• identifying objectives and establishing priorities among them; 
• selecting projects that will best advance those objectives; and 
• overseeing performance and evaluating how well objectives are 
being met. 
The more substantial the investment, the more informed, inclusive, and 
transparent those processes should be.  To develop the expertise and sustain 
the resource commitment necessary for major impact, organizations need to 
limit their substantive fields and focus on manageable goals.170 
 
 168. James Austin, Strategic Alliances, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2003, at 
50; see also BREST & HARVEY, supra note 119, at 224. 
 169. TELES, supra note 3, at 20; Austin, supra note 168, at 54. 
 170. Michael A. Bailin, Requestioning, Reimagining, and Retooling Philanthropy, 32 
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 635, 636 (2003) (describing the need for focus); see 
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A second lesson from strategic philanthropy is the importance of devel-
oping appropriate measures of long-term impact.  An example comes from 
Gary Blasi’s experience with a Los Angeles slumlord.171  In successive 
lawsuits against that building owner, a neighborhood legal aid office de-
clared victory; it prevented evictions, obtained significant monetary judg-
ments, and used the litigation to organize a tenants union.  None of these 
cases, however, were able to force structural changes in the building that 
would have prevented future code violations and increased the supply of 
habitable housing.  In retrospect, Blasi questions whether a different strat-
egy might have been a better use of limited resources.  But that question 
would never even have surfaced if, as is often the case, the organization 
tracked only short-term outcomes, not long-term results. 
A third insight from strategic philanthropy involves the value of collabo-
ration.  Given the scale of problems they are typically addressing, public 
interest legal initiatives are up against what experts label “unsuitable 
odds.”172  In these contexts, significant change generally depends on exten-
sive consultation and strategic alliances.  Even organizations that are look-
ing for a distinctive niche will benefit from working with other players and 
stakeholders to identify the best opportunity.  All of these groups will also 
profit from developing common metrics of evaluation and benchmarking 
results against those of comparable programs.173 
A final lesson concerns accountability.  Given their relative insularity 
from market discipline and government regulation, public interest organiza-
tions and pro bono programs need structures for ensuring adequate feed-
back.  In the long run, neither those who give nor those who receive legal 
and financial assistance are well-served by the common “don’t ask, don’t 
tell” approach concerning well-intentioned but ill-conceived efforts.  In 
commenting on the Los Angeles slumlord case, Blasi noted that too often, 
legal aid and public interest lawyers go “for years feeling effective without 
ever actually examining the empirical facts to validate that feeling.”174  Or-
ganizations that want to maximize their social impact need pressure to as-
sess their long-term impact and safe spaces to share their difficulties. 
 
also CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PHILANTHROPY, supra note 163, at 9-10 (noting that nearly all 
CEOs agreed on the importance of limiting project areas). 
 171. See Blasi, supra note 120. 
 172. Harvey & Mertz, supra note 134, at 2; see also Bailin, supra note 170, at 636 (not-
ing the eventual recognition by Edna McConnell Clark Foundation leaders of the futility of 
trying to “reform huge, complex entrenched multibillion-dollar public systems with a staff 
of 25 people and around $25 million a year in grants.”). 
 173. WILLIAM & FLORA HEWLETT FOUND. & MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 156, at 43. 
 174. Blasi, supra note 120, at 70-71 (on file with authors). 
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1. Pro Bono Contributions 
Lawyers’ pro bono contributions have played a central and increasing 
role in public interest litigation.  As noted earlier, part of the increase is due 
to the rising support by legal employers, the legal media, and the organized 
bar.175  Another factor is the growing scale and complexity of social impact 
initiatives, and the inability of nonprofit organizations to keep pace without 
outside help.  About half of leading public interest organizations rely ex-
tensively on pro bono collaboration, and another third report moderate col-
laboration.176  Almost all of these organizations involve private lawyers in 
impact litigation, and partner with them in about half of their major cas-
es.177 
a. The Extent of Pro Bono Work 
How much unpaid effort lawyers devote to public interest cases is im-
possible to assess with any precision.  Only seven states require reporting 
of pro bono work, and neither they, nor other published surveys provide 
much detail on the nature of contributions.  The best available data come 
from a 2008 ABA study, which found that almost three-quarters of lawyers 
provided some pro bono assistance to persons of limited means or organi-
zations serving them, for an average amount of forty-one hours per year.178  
About two-thirds of lawyers reported serving individuals rather than or-
ganizations, and only 7% of that aid went to pursuit of civil rights or liber-
ties or other public rights.179  Service to organizations included a wide 
range of groups, not just those targeted to public interest causes or indi-
viduals of limited means, and service encompassed a range of activities be-
sides litigation assistance.180  
Although the portion of pro bono work that goes towards social impact 
work remains unclear, there is little dispute that more and better focused 
assistance is needed.  Only a quarter of the lawyers in the ABA’s study met 
 
 175. ABA surveys have found an increase in the number of lawyers who engage in pro 
bono work, as well as in their amount of service over the past five years.  See ABA STAND-
ING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., SUPPORTING JUSTICE II, A REPORT ON THE PRO 
BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS 21 (2009) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM.].  The 
American Lawyer’s survey of the 200 most profitable firms also registers an increase. 
 176. Rhode, Public Interest Law, supra note 3, at 2070. 
 177. Id. 
 178. ABA STANDING COMM., supra note 175, at 3. 
 179. Id. at vii, 17. 
 180. Id. at 9, 17 (noting that service to organizations did not track the ABA Model Rule 
definition singling out organizations serving clients of limited means, and that 60% of law-
yers believed that sitting on a board of a non-profit organization or providing legal training 
could qualify as pro bono work). 
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its aspirational norm of fifty hours of assistance to persons of limited 
means or to organizations that serve them.181  The percentage of lawyers 
providing any such assistance was disturbingly low in some sectors of the 
profession, such as corporate counsel (43%) and government (30%).182  In 
the American Lawyer’s latest survey of the nation’s 200 most profitable 
firms, only 40% of lawyers had contributed at least twenty hours a year.183  
A significant amount of what lawyers define as pro bono work includes bar 
activities, public education, and favors for friends, family, or coworkers.184  
However valuable, relatively little of this work is likely to qualify as strate-
gic philanthropy; it is seldom part of a focused initiative to achieve social 
impact. 
b. The Rationale for Greater Pro Bono Involvement 
The failure of more attorneys to become involved in significant public 
interest initiatives represents a missed opportunity for both the profession 
and the public.  Bar surveys find that lawyers’ greatest source of dissatis-
faction in practice is their lack of contribution to the social good.185  For 
many attorneys, participation in impact work is a way to restore that con-
nection, to feel that they are “making a difference,” and to express the val-
ues that sent them to law school in the first instance.186  Assistance to ra-
cial, ethnic or other disadvantaged groups can also be an important form of 
“giving back” and affirming identity.187  There are also practical payoffs.  
Public interest litigation can bring recognition, contacts, trial experience, 
 
 181. Id. at 3.  For the ABA’s Model Rule on Pro Bono Service, see MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1. 
 182. ABA STANDING COMM., supra note 175, at 10. 
 183. See Press, supra note 117; Nate Raymond, A Silver Lining, AM. LAW., July 2008, at 
101. 
 184. The ABA’s survey finds that a majority of referrals come from sources other than 
legal aid organizations, such as other attorneys (13%), family/friends (11%), cowork-
ers/employers (7%) and court/judge (5%).  ABA STANDING COMM., supra note 175, at 14.  
The survey finds that most lawyers also consider bar activities and speaking on legal topics 
pro bono.  Id. at 9.  For prior surveys on sources of pro bono work, see RHODE, supra note 5, 
at 19, 145-48. 
 185. AM. BAR ASS’N., ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION SURVEY, CAREER SATISFACTION 
19 (2000). 
 186. RHODE, supra note 5, at 131-32. 
 187. See generally Robert Granfield, The Meaning of Pro Bono: Institutional Variations 
in Professional Obligations Among Lawyers, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 137 (2007); Ro-
bert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, It’s Hard to be a Human Being and a Lawyer: Young At-
torneys and the Confrontation with the Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L. 
REV. 496 (2003); David Wilkins, Doing Well By Doing Good?  The Role of Public Service 
in the Careers of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
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and skill development that will ultimately yield career advantages.188  Le-
gal employers also stand to benefit in ways that vary somewhat across the 
practice settings described below. 
For society generally, lawyers’ involvement in impact litigation has 
played a central role in advancing public values.  Pro bono assistance has 
helped protect fundamental rights, establish crucial principles, save indi-
vidual lives, and safeguard the environment.189  Finding more ways to at-
tract private lawyers to this work and ensure the most cost-effective use of 
their assistance should be professional priorities. 
c. Large Law Firms: Opportunities for Influence 
The pro bono contributions of large law firms have increased substan-
tially in both quantity and quality over the last decade.  The average contri-
butions of the top 100 law firms have more than doubled since the turn of 
the twenty-first century.190  Among 135 large firms tracked by the Pro Bo-
no Institute, contributions have increased 170% since 1995.191  Large firms 
have also become more strategic in managing their aid.  About half of the 
nation’s 200 most profitable firms have at least one full time pro bono law-
yer or coordinator, up from about a dozen in 2000.192  These individuals 
bring a more professional focus to public service initiatives, and can chan-
nel efforts in ways that maximize social impact. 
Underlying these trends is a growing recognition that effective pro bono 
programs serve institutional as well as societal interests.  Particularly for 
junior attorneys, public interest litigation can offer training, trial experi-
ence, intellectual challenge, and responsibility far beyond what is available 
in their other work.193  As corporate clients become increasingly unwilling 
to subsidize professional development opportunities for young associates, 
and firms become too highly leveraged to provide such opportunities to all 
 
 188. RHODE, supra note 5, at 131-32; Granfield, supra note 187, at 139; Esther F. Lar-
dent, Pro Bono in Uncertain Times: Learning from the Past/Looking to the Future, PRO BO-
NO WIRE, July 2008, at 2-3; Karen Lash, Pitching Your Pro Bono Projects: Getting to ‘Yes’ 
with the ‘ Big Firm”, 2 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 3, 7-8 (2008). 
 189. For the work of public interest organizations that receive pro bono assistance, see 
Rhode, Public Interest Law, supra note 3, at 2040-41. 
 190. See Raymond, supra note 183. 
 191. Michael Moline, In the Business of Doing Good: Pro Bono Projects Help Firms De-
fine Their Identities, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 5, 2007, at 1. 
 192. Daphne Eviatar, Pro Bono Pros, AM. LAW., July 2008, at 104; see also Moline, su-
pra note 191, at 13 (describing improved managerial focus of firm programs); Emmett Berg, 
Pro Bono Goes Full Time, CAL. LAW., Dec. 2008 (describing full-time pro bono coordinator 
positions in California firms). 
 193. RHODE, supra note 5, at 30; Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, supra note 5, at 
113; Granfield, supra note 187, at 138. 
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who need them, pro bono representation fills an important gap.  Firm lead-
ers consistently cite these professional benefits, along with recruitment and 
retention, as primary justifications for their public service initiatives.194  
Such work can also enhance the firms’ reputation and visibility in the 
community, and improve their rankings in the American Lawyer, which 
rates the pro bono programs of the 200 most profitable firms based on the 
number of hours per lawyer and the percentage of lawyers who contribute 
more than twenty hours.  A firm’s pro bono rating also accounts for a third 
of its score in the competition for membership on the American Lawyer’s 
coveted “A-List” of the nation’s top twenty firms.  So too, a student- run 
organization, Building a Better Legal Profession, also has begun to rank 
law firms on their pro bono performance.195 
As firms’ public service reputation becomes more visible, it also be-
comes more important to clients and potential recruits.196  Despite recent 
slowdowns in hiring, there remains a “war for talent,” and “many if not 
most of the lawyers these firms want to hire” expect public interest oppor-
tunities.197  Moreover, in the current economic downturn, such opportuni-
ties have also become increasingly important as way stations for underem-
ployed or furloughed attorneys.  This, of course, makes pro bono programs 
easier to sell as a purely financial proposition.  As one lawyer in an Ameri-
can Foundation study put it: “[l]aw firms do not support pro bono unless 
there is a business reason to do so.  The bottom line on this question is the 
bottom line.”198  From this perspective, pro bono looks like a sound in-
vestment in law firm image and market position.199  Another lawyer ex-
pressed the common view with uncommon candor: “We’re not running a 
charity here.  This is good business and essential business for large 
firms.”200 
 
 194. See AM. BAR FOUND., NEW APPROACHES TO ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES: RESEARCH, 
PRACTICE AND POLICY 10 (2006), available at http://www.americanbarfoundation. 
org/uploads/cms/documents/rlmoserfund.pdf; Brent Harris, Fulfilling the Promise of Law 
Firm Pro Bono (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
 195. Building a Better Legal Profession, http://www.betterlegalprofession.org/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 27, 2009). 
 196. See Eviatar, supra note 192, at 106 (quoting Ronald Tabak, pro bono coordinator for 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, about the increasing number of external constituen-
cies, “including potential recruits, who now care about how big or successful a pro bono 
program you have”). 
 197. Daniels & Martin, supra note 88, at 154. 
 198. AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 194, at 6. 
 199. See Harris, supra note 194, at 29-30 (2008); see also Ben Hallman, Starting at the 
Top, AM. LAW., July 2007, at 95. 
 200. Daniels & Martin, supra note 88, at 153. 
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d. Challenges and Constraints 
Yet one unsettling byproduct of the “business case” for public service is 
that, as with corporate giving, the public can sometimes fall by the way-
side.  Problems arise along two main dimensions: lack of clarity in priori-
ties, and insufficient oversight and accountability concerning performance. 
A threshold difficulty involves the multiple objectives of pro bono pro-
grams, which sometimes tug in different directions.  Relatively small cases 
offering the greatest responsibility and experience for junior associates do 
not generally provide the greatest visibility for the firm or social impact for 
the community.  And policies that maximize choice and satisfaction for in-
dividual attorneys may not serve other institutional priorities.  Well-
publicized difficulties have surfaced when pro bono attorneys have chal-
lenged policies on positional conflicts, or have wanted to litigate controver-
sial cases in areas such as affirmative action, abortion, and gay/lesbian 
rights.201 
When asked about g case selection, firm leaders often fall back on plati-
tudes: as one put it, “I’d like to think [our choice of work] reflects val-
ues.”202  But which values?  There is obviously value in providing repre-
sentation for unpopular positions and allowing lawyers to choose where to 
put their charitable efforts.  There is also value in having firms focus re-
sources in ways that are widely supported by their members and their 
communities, and that seek to maximize social impact.  Under the latter 
approach, lawyers can always pursue different commitments on their own 
time. 
There is, of course, no single appropriate resolution of these questions, 
but there are better and worse processes for deciding them.  An important 
lesson from strategic philanthropy is that firm leadership needs to be clear 
about objectives, inclusive in the way it sets priorities, and well-informed 
about what work might best advance them.  In effectively managed pro-
grams, multiple goals need not be mutually exclusive.  Firms can offer a 
range of opportunities that accommodate different concerns.  Programs that 
are strategic will also seek projects that are cost-effective, that build on dis-
tinctive capabilities, fill urgent needs, and hold capacity for systemic 
changes.  The ABA’s Standards for Pro Bono Programs underscore the im-
portance of assessing community needs and many firms have become in-
creasingly proactive in doing so.203  So, for example, after surveying local 
 
 201. For protests regarding positional conflicts, see supra text accompanying note 94; for 
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service providers, one Philadelphia firm decided to assist veterans and the 
elderly; a Los Angeles firm focused on abused and neglected children; and 
a San Francisco Bay area firm concentrated on guardianship proceed-
ings.204  Such approaches can be especially cost-effective because the 
firm’s investment in training and contacts pays off in multiple cases. 
Maximizing social impact, however, is more challenging and often re-
quires collaboration with other groups that have relevant expertise and re-
sources.  A model of such joint efforts is a coalition among the Los Ange-
les City Attorney’s Office, the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, the 
Los Angeles Community Action Network, and several Los Angeles firms 
to address housing issues in the city’s Skid Row.  Each member of the coa-
lition brings distinctive strengths: law firms offer resources and litigation 
expertise; nonprofit organizations have knowledge of substantive law and 
community needs; and city prosecutors have special investigative capaci-
ties and the leverage of criminal and civil penalties.205  Yet all too often, 
the complexities and compromises necessary in collaboration, together with 
the desire for some distinctive signature program, prevent the partnerships 
that might maximize social impact. 
A second challenge for pro bono programs is oversight.  Here again, 
ABA Standards for Pro Bono Programs, as well as frameworks developed 
for strategic philanthropy, provide appropriate criteria for assessing effec-
tiveness.  Firms need systematic information about the quality of services, 
the outcomes achieved, the satisfaction of clients and pro bono partners, 
and the long-term impact of assistance.  Such oversight is too often notice-
able for its absence.206  One result is that almost half of recently surveyed 
public interest organizations, reported extensive or moderate problems in 
the quality of pro bono assistance they received.207  Some volunteers lack 
the relevant skill sets or supervision.208  Others lack the time.  As public in-
terest leaders noted, practitioners may “want to do pro bono work in theory 
but in practice, don’t [always] want to make the commitment.”209  Some 
firms look for “training and opportunities for bored associates but don’t 
want to give them the time . . . when other paid work comes up.”210 
 
 204. Michael Aneiro, Room to Improve, AM. LAW., July 2006, at 102; Eviatar, supra note 
192, at 106; Harris, supra note 194, at 27, 45. 
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 206. See supra text accompanying note 141. 
 207. See Rhode, Public Interest Law, supra note 3, at 2071. 
 208. Id. at 2071-72 (problems range from lack of knowledge of substantive law and pro-
cedure to an inability to take a deposition). 
 209. Id. at 2072 (quoting Richard Rothschild, Western Center on Law & Poverty). 
 210. Id. (quoting Steven Bright, Southern Center for Human Rights). 
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At the root of the problem is accountability.  As in other philanthropic 
contexts where the need for help vastly exceeds the supply, those who con-
tribute assistance often face inadequate pressure to worry about recipients’ 
satisfaction or other measures of cost-effectiveness.211  The problem is ex-
acerbated by media ranking structures that focus only on the quantity, and 
not quality, of pro bono service.  Indeed, as some program coordinators 
note, current frameworks penalize efficiency; a supervising partner who 
prevents pointless time-consuming work makes the firm’s hourly “statistics 
in the American Lawyer look worse.”212 
This is not to suggest that checks on quality are entirely missing.  Well-
established public interest organizations, which generally control access to 
the most interesting high-visibility cases, can afford to be selective in their 
choice of outside counsel.  Many receive more requests for pro bono work 
than they can accommodate, and choose firms that have demonstrated a 
commitment to effective representation.213  So too, most lawyers have in-
ternalized an ethic of client service and care about their reputation among 
colleagues and the local community.  But even the best intentioned attor-
neys may operate with unduly flattering self-evaluations when more disin-
terested forms of oversight are absent. 
The same is true of social impact.  One firm leader described a common 
state with uncommon candor: “we cannot opine as to which of our pro bo-
no projects most effectively contributes to the community.”214  And why 
should they?  Who wants to spoil the “helper’s high” that comes from vol-
unteer work, or the favorable write ups in firm publications and press re-
leases with annoying qualifications concerning long-term impact?215 
Yet the same societal concerns that prompt law firms to take on signifi-
cant public interest work should also prompt efforts to assess its effective-
ness.  In the absence of formal structures of accountability, firms need to 
create their own.  The Association for Pro Bono Counsel can push in that 
direction.  Just as the Center for Effective Philanthropy has encouraged 
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foundations to pay attention to evaluations from its grantees, the Associa-
tion could pressure law firms to seek assessments from clients and commu-
nity partners.216  Media ranking structures could also include information 
about oversight structures, and more forums could be available for pro bo-
no coordinators to share insights from failures as well as successes.  A use-
ful model is the Hewlett Foundation’s annual practice of having program 
officers identify their worst mistake and what they learned from it.217  Only 
through more systematic evaluation processes can law firms take full ad-
vantage of their charitable capacities. 
2. Public Interest Organizations 
Most of the key lessons from research on social change and strategic 
philanthropy are reflected in the evolution of public interest legal organiza-
tions.  Over the past three decades, these groups have grown dramatically 
in size and scope, largely in response to a corresponding growth in the 
scale and complexity of problems they are addressing.218  Groups that 
started with a few idealists and several well timed lawsuits have become 
multi-million dollar organizations with multifaceted agendas.  As they have 
evolved, public interest groups have become increasingly strategic in their 
approaches and mindful of the capacities and constraints of litigation. 
a. The Strategic Value of Litigation 
As Part I noted, a long-standing criticism of public interest legal organi-
zations is that they have relied too heavily on lawsuits at the expense of 
broader social and political strategies.219  Many leading organizations be-
gan with a litigation focus that quickly proved inadequate to the task.  En-
vironmental law is a case in point.  In organizations like the Sierra Club, 
the legal staff’s initial philosophy was “Just say no.  Shut it down, clean it 
up.”220  So too, the Natural Resources Defense Council first defined its 
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mission as “identify polluters and make them stop.”221  And for Earth Jus-
tice, litigation victories were seen as “ends in themselves.”222 
Yet as soon became apparent, judicial decrees without a political base 
are vulnerable to chronic non-compliance, public backlash, statutory rever-
sal, or judicial retrenchment.223  In many contexts, courts lack the necessary 
expertise, legitimacy, and enforcement resources to secure lasting 
change.224  And in other contexts involving fundamental rights, public in-
terest organizations lack the resources to represent more than a small frac-
tion of deserving claims.  “Bailing with a thimble” is how many leaders de-
fine the challenge.225 
Further limitations of litigation arise from opportunity constraints under-
scored by social movement theory, particularly the growing conservatism 
of the federal courts and the difficulties of obtaining major victories in ju-
dicial forums.  Over the past two decades, doctrine has “gone south” on 
many issues central to public interest work such as standing, mootness, civ-
il rights, attorneys’ fees, civil liberties, welfare, prison reform, consumer 
protection and capital defense.226  At the same time, clear villains and vic-
tims are harder to come by.  Defendants are more sophisticated and dis-
crimination is more subtle.  Litigation has become more fact-sensitive, the 
facts are less clear cut, and judicial solutions are more elusive and expen-
sive.  Richard Rothschild of the Western Center on Law and Poverty puts it 
bluntly: “There are fewer easy cases.”227 
Leaders of contemporary public interest organizations generally ac-
knowledge these limitations.  It is, they recognize, impossible to “create 
policy,” “change attitudes,” or “build a movement” solely through litiga-
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tion.228  Rather, as Ralph Nader once summed it up: “You have to deal with 
the adversary on all the fronts on which your adversary deals with you.”229 
Yet courts also remain a necessary, if by no means a sufficient, forum 
for public interest work.  As social movement theory suggests, and experi-
ence confirms, other more political approaches often require a level of fi-
nancial and popular support that many groups find difficult to marshal.230  
Courts may not always be the most effective dispute resolution forums, but 
they are often the most accessible; they are open as of right and can force 
more economically or politically powerful parties to the bargaining table.231  
As the preceding research on social movements makes clear, litigation can 
build public awareness, help frame problems as injustices, and reinforce a 
sense of collective identity, all of which can build a political base for re-
form.232 
b. Strategic Focus, Collaboration, and Evaluation 
In describing their most effective approaches, public interest leaders 
echo other themes from social movement theory and strategic philanthropy 
concerning the importance of collaboration and communication.233  Some 
groups’ greatest successes come from partnering with community organiza-
tions and helping them become more effective advocates.  “Victory” in this 
context is often legal representation that leaves a client organization 
“stronger, and in a position to monitor and enforce a favorable decision.”234  
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Public interest organizations, like strategic philanthropists, are sometimes 
instrumental in founding these groups or training their members.235  Other 
coalitions involve the kind of partnerships among non-profits and corpora-
tions that research on philanthropy and social movements has advocated.236  
Public interest organizations are also devoting more attention to public 
education and are becoming more skilled in providing it.  Putting a “human 
face on social problems” and showcasing “real life stories” of injustice are 
critical.237  Many organizations are also increasingly effective in using in-
ternet technologies and blogs to mobilize support.238 
Yet while public interest organizations have clearly grown more strate-
gic in their focus, many lack the formal and inclusive processes of deci-
sion-making and evaluation that research on strategic philanthropy recom-
mends.  For example, in establishing priorities, only about a quarter of 
leading public interest organization make significant efforts to include 
stakeholders such as a clients or community groups.239  Although the crite-
ria that organizations use to select cases are typically consistent with a stra-
tegic framework, few organizations operate with explicitly articulated theo-
ries of change or specific measures of performance.  Rather, most rely on 
staff assessments of what needs are most urgent, where there are gaps in 
coverage, where they can bring value added, and where they see the great-
est likelihood of success.240  Some leaders express skepticism or frustration 
concerning funders’ insistence on more “measurable outcomes.”241  Yet 
none of those surveyed have much experience with systematic assessment 
frameworks or principled objections to their use. 
c. Challenges and Constraints 
The central challenge for contemporary public interest organizations, as 
their leaders generally perceive it, involves not formulating strategies, but 
developing the funding and policy leverage to implement them.  Virtually 
all organizations report major difficulties in meeting their financial needs.  
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Some confront equally daunting obstacles in mobilizing the other sources 
of influence that social movement theory identifies as critical. 
The challenges vary across substantive areas.  Environmental organiza-
tions have what seems to be the most favorable opportunity structure in 
terms of public support and access to funding.  But they also confront prob-
lems of massive global dimensions and opponents with substantial re-
sources and political leverage.242  Civil rights and women’s rights groups 
bump up against cultural complacency—the perception that “we’ve solved 
that.”243  Children may seem more sympathetic than other groups but they 
have neither the votes nor money necessary for political leverage.244  Tech-
nology organizations have difficulty framing issues in ways that are com-
pelling to the public; they lack pictures of “belching smokestacks or kids 
with AIDS,” and “peoples’ eyes glaze over” when the discussion turns 
technical, even if serious privacy and free speech concerns are involved.245  
Still greater challenges arise with groups that Americans find easy to de-
monize, such as prisoners, death-row defendants, and undocumented immi-
grants.246 
Further difficulties arise from the growing competition for resources and 
recognition.  As more public interest organizations enter the arena, they 
face increasing pressure to distinguish themselves from other groups.  The 
result, as leaders often acknowledge, is that too much work occurs in isola-
tion, and too many coalitions are sabotaged by infighting over credit.247  
Problems are compounded by lawyers’ lack of training in running nonprofit 
organizations.  The skills required for effective lawyering are not the same 
as those required for effective management and marketing.  “Why didn’t I 
go to business school?,” was one director’s question.248 
Most of these challenges are by no means insurmountable.  Law schools, 
continuing education programs, bar organizations, and non-profit groups 
could all do more to equip public interest leaders with managerial and stra-
tegic evaluation skills.  Funders could provide more support for assess-
ments and coalition work.  More forums could be made available for can-
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did dialogue about lessons learned from unsuccessful strategies or inade-
quate assessment. 
Greater effort could also center on expanding resources, and on building 
collaborative funding initiatives.  One notable failure of current organiza-
tional structures is their inability to realize the full potential of pro bono 
support.  Although virtually all of the leading public interest organizations 
report that they are understaffed and overextended, only about a quarter be-
lieve that they could benefit from increased volunteers.249  Part of the rea-
son involves the quality concerns discussed below.  But much of the prob-
lem lies in inadequate resources to identify projects, and provide 
supervision and backup services.  Private lawyers, bar associations, and 
public interest organizations all need to work together to strengthen the fi-
nancial foundations for public service. 
CONCLUSION 
In The Last Lecture, Randy Pautsch noted that “[e]xperience is what you 
get when you didn’t get what you wanted.”250  If public interest litigation 
has not always delivered all that we desire, it has surely provided no lack of 
experience.  Our challenge now is to integrate these lessons from practice 
with insights from allied disciplines.  Taken together, they remind us of the 
need to coordinate litigation with broader mobilizing efforts, to think stra-
tegically about effectiveness, and to create adequate systems of evaluation 
and accountability.  These are no small tasks, and we are grateful for occa-
sions like this symposium to reflect more deeply about the capacities and 
constraints of law in pursuit of social justice. 
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